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I. INTRODUCTION

The end of a great war frequently brings a revision of the laws
of war in its wake. The close of World War I saw the drafting of the
1929 Geneva Conventions to protect wounded soldiers and prisoners of
war. A more elaborate set of treaties, the Geneva Conventions of
1949, granting further protections to soldiers, sailors, prisoners of
war, and civilians, followed the conclusion of World War II. The
aftermath of the Cold War saw its own revolution in the laws of war.
This revision, however, did not occur in the context of a formal treaty
negotiation. The post-1989 development has been more complex and
subtle than earlier efforts, and its full contours remain unclear. This
latest phase in the life of the laws of war is a consequence of the
interaction between two formally separate legal regimes: the law of
armed conflict and international criminal law.
This Article tells the story of international criminal law's
transformation of the laws of war from 1945 through 2005.
It
recounts how nation-states fought bitterly in the negotiations over the
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1949 Geneva Conventions, and during their subsequent revision in
1977, over whether the laws of war should apply to civil wars. In
those negotiations, states opposing the application of the rules to civil
wars won the day. The possibility of enforcing the laws of war in an
international court was unanimously rejected by the delegates. These
decisions, however, were both erased in the 1990s by the United
Nations Security Council's decision to create two temporary ad hoc
tribunals-the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") (collectively the Tribunals)-and by these courts'
ensuing judicial decisions. Their jurisprudence on the law of war was
subsequently codified into the treaty creating a permanent court
devoted to international criminal law, the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"). Although the United States has served as the principal
proponent of the development of international criminal institutions
since 1945, it has seen the regime that it created transformed into the
ICC, an institution it currently finds deeply inimical.
This story is of more than historical interest. It sheds light on
questions critical to contemporary international relations and to the
study of international institutions.
The interaction between
international criminal law and the laws of war suggests the
importance of international judicial lawmaking, illustrates the
powerful role that temporary institutions can play in the development
of international norms, and underscores the importance of theoretical
models of international relations that account for changes in states'
preferences over time. In this story, the positions of key states
change, and the institutions themselves play an important
transformative role.
The principal issues addressed in this Article, international
judicial lawmaking and institutional transformation, center on one
pivotal moment, the decision by the U.N. Security Council to vest
enforcement of the laws of war in two international courts of limited
temporal and geographical jurisdiction. This decision created an
international judiciary to adjudicate war crimes and, in so doing, to
interpret the principal treaties on the laws of war. The judges on
these courts have significantly revised the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions-particularly with regard to civil war and ethnic conflict.
Through judicial lawmaking, these judges effectively embraced the
negotiating positions taken by the Great Powers, especially the United
States, in 1949 and 1977 and erased the victories garnered by
developing countries in the negotiations. The Tribunals' law-of-war
jurisprudence, therefore, undercuts the view voiced prominently by
some U.S. officials and scholars that international courts, particularly
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courts with a human rights focus, demonstrate an anti-American
bias.1 Instead, the Tribunals have endorsed views advanced by the
United States and declared them to be customary international law,
binding on all other states.
Conventional accounts of international law and politics
challenge the legitimacy of the Tribunals' lawmaking. As a matter of
formal international law, only nation-states possess the authority to
make law. 2
When the Security Council created the Tribunals,
members of the Council emphatically declared that the Tribunals
would not and should not make new law. Despite the weak doctrinal
and political bases for the Tribunals' lawmaking, the historical record
suggests that states appear to have accepted, even embraced, it.
States have codified the Tribunals' revision of the laws of war into the
treaty governing the ICC. Furthermore, states have not sanctioned
the Tribunals' judges for their lawmaking, although they have
disciplined the Tribunals' prosecutor on several occasions.
International
judicial
decisionmaking
has
increased
3
dramatically in the past decade.
Understanding its role in
international criminal law provides an opportunity to evaluate the
normative implications of the judicialization of international relations.
This Article argues that states often tacitly delegate lawmaking
authority and that the Security Council did so in the case of the
Tribunals. Although the historical record cannot definitely prove its
validity, this hypothesis is supported by evidence from other
international courts that lawmaking by international judiciaries is
widespread and accepted by states, even if formally proscribed. 4 The
Article suggests that states do not acknowledge this delegation,
1.

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 10

(2003).
Judges of international courts-the International Court of Justice (World Court), the
European Court of Human Rights, and, predictably, the new International Criminal
Court (ICC), among other forums-are continuing to undermine democratic
institutions and to enact the agenda of the liberal Left or New Class. Internationally,
that agenda contains a toxic measure of anti-Americanism.
Id.
2.

See Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations, 285 RECUEIL

DES COURS 9, 34 (2000).

3.
Karen Alter, for example, estimates that 63 percent of international judicial activity has
occurred in the last twelve years. Karen J. Alter, Do International Courts Enhance Compliance
with InternationalLaw?, 25 REV. ASIAN & PAC. STUD. 51, 52 (2003).
4.

See generally TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL

BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION (2004) (examining the World Trade Organization);
Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 43 (1993) (discussing "legal integration[:] ... the gradual
penetration of [the law of the European Court of Justice] into the domestic law of its member
states").
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however, in order both to perpetuate the fiction of state hegemony
over international norm generation and to provide a shield behind
which international courts can make law without suffering paralyzing
political pressure that would negate their ability to do so.
As a normative matter, this Article argues that international
judicial lawmaking is most appropriate when the relevant underlying
treaties are old, where underlying conditions have changed, and where
there is little prospect for the treaties' revision. International judicial
lawmaking can usefully modulate the contradictory demands of rule
stability and flexibility in the face of changing conditions, a central
5
challenge for all international institutions.
The history of the international criminal regime also suggests
the benefits of temporary international courts for those who seek to
further the development of a particular body of law. The trend among
international institutions, exemplified by the creation of the World
Trade Organization, is toward permanent organizations. The promise
of temporary international courts has largely been overlooked. The
international criminal tribunals demonstrate that temporally and
geographically limited courts can serve as important sources of norm
generation, which interested states and NGOs can then leverage to
push for the creation of a more comprehensive institutional solution.
Turning from the question of judicial lawmaking to that of
institutional development, the Article considers changes in the
international criminal regime writ large. As with the development of
the laws of war, the key moment was the Security Council's creation of
the ICTY-an entity championed, and then rescued from near-death,
by the United States. The history from 1945-1997 portrays the United
States as the dominant-indeed, the critical-force in international
criminal enforcement. In 1997, however, the United States lost a key
battle on the jurisdiction of the ICC. The United States was outvoted
in the treaty negotiations and now acts as the ICC's most determined
opponent.
This history highlights the importance of theoretical models
that account for changes in states' preferences and for the dynamic
role played by international institutions themselves. The story told
here includes significant shifts in various states' approaches to
international criminal law. Although the United States' volte face is
well known, Great Britain's change of stance is equally important.
When Britain was a colonial power, it sought to quash the application
of the laws of war to civil wars and to preclude the possibility of their

5.

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, Rational Design: Looking Back

to Move Forward,55 INT'L ORG. 1051, 1076 (2001) [hereinafter Koremenos et al., Looking Back].
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Britain similarly opposed the fledgling Yugoslav
enforcement.
Tribunal.
The Labor Party's victory in 1997 and Tony Blair's
elevation as prime minister, however, heralded a shift in Britain's
attitude towards international criminal enforcement. Britain's later
defection from the negotiating position taken by the other members of
the Security Council in the ICC negotiations doomed the U.S. vision of
a court whose jurisdiction would be subject to the Council's control.
More broadly, the international criminal regime illustrates how
international institutions can transform the environment in which
states debate the proper scope, content, and enforcement schemes for
international rules. The ICTY and ICTR led directly to the ICC and
strongly influenced its jurisdictional scheme. These temporary courts
proved that international criminal punishment was possible, and they
highlighted the injustice of the selective prosecution model of
international criminal law they embodied. Rules developed by the
ICTY and ICTR have been disseminated directly into other
international and domestic courts by the Tribunals' staff and
indirectly through citation by these courts to the Tribunals' judicial
decisions. From the perspective of the United States, this is a story of
unintended (and unwanted) consequences.
The sixty-year saga of the interaction between the laws of war
and the development of international criminal law has not yet been
told in a single account. Parts II and III of this Article, therefore,
tackle a wide range of political and legal developments. Although
reduced to their essentials, these stories remain quite complex. Part
II examines these histories from 1945 through the end of the Cold War
in 1989. It pays particular attention to the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals and to the negotiation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
their subsequent amendment in 1974-77. Relying on the official
records from the Diplomatic Conferences, it concentrates on the
positions taken by the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, France,
Great Britain, and China (otherwise known as the P-5). Part III
describes the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR by the Security
Council, again highlighting the positions taken by the P-5. Part III
then sets out the key features of the ICTY's and ICTR's war crimes
jurisprudence, focusing on the cases and the issues that were the
subject of particular controversy at the earlier Diplomatic
Conferences. Part III also describes the negotiations of the treaty
governing the ICC, concentrating on the provisions related to war
crimes and jurisdiction.
Part IV considers the legal and political implications of the
international judicial lawmaking undertaken by the Tribunals.
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Through the prism of principal-agent theory, it asks whether the
Tribunals should be considered faithful agents or ones that have
departed from the wishes of the Security Council. The principal claim
in Part IV is that states often deliberately delegate international
judicial lawmaking, and that, even absent specific delegation, judicial
lawmaking is normatively justifiable under certain conditions. Part V
argues that the history of the development of international criminal
law highlights the importance of change in international relations,
both through alterations in state preferences and through
international institutional development. This history also suggests
the benefits of temporary international institutions-particularly
courts-for developing an area of international law where the usual
treaty-making process is stalled. The Conclusion considers the future
of international criminal law, the potential impact of the War on
Terrorism on the laws of war, and the implications for future research
suggested by the Article's findings.

II. DEFINING AND ENFORCING THE LAWS OF WAR
The major treaties on the laws of war address three distinct
aspects of this legal regime: the scope of the rules (particularly the
kinds of conflicts governed by the law), the content of the rules, and
their enforcement mechanisms. The provisions of the Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War provide an
illustration. The Fourth Hague Convention has a limited scope; it
applies only to wars in which all belligerents are parties to the treaty.6
With regard to content, the Fourth Hague Convention includes rules
governing the treatment of prisoners of war but does not address the
treatment of civilians. 7 The Fourth Hague Convention also lacks an
enforcement mechanism, although it requires all signatories to
instruct their armies to obey the rules of the treaty,8 and it declares
that a belligerent party that violates the treaty "shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation. 9 The other treaties on the
law of war drafted before the end of World War Two II share the
structure, and modest ambition, of the Fourth Hague Convention.
Significantly, none of these treaties applies to civil wars. This
limitation on the conventions' scope means that, under these treaties,
6.
See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
7.
It does contain rules for dealing with the population of a territory under occupation. Id.
arts. 42-56.
8. Id. art. 1.
9.
Id. art. 3.
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states are not restricted by international law in crafting a military
response to internal rebellions. 10 Captured fighters do not have to be
accorded prisoner of war status, for example, and can be treated as
traitors or common criminals, as the country sees fit.
The end of World War II marked an important shift in the laws
of war. For a short time, the laws of war and international criminal
law were joined in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals established to
adjudicate the war-related crimes of the German and Japanese
leaders.
While plans for these tribunals were underway, the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") began the process
of convening a diplomatic conference for the purpose of rewriting the
Geneva Conventions. The 1949 Conference saw significant debate
over the proper scope of the Geneva Conventions and the introduction
of a novel enforcement mechanism.
A. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
With the end of World War II in sight, the victorious Allies
considered how to punish the German officers and political leaders
that led Germany on its drive to dominate Europe. The existing
treaties on the laws of war, including the Hague Conventions of 1907
and the Geneva Conventions of 1929, made no mention of criminal
punishment. The British and influential members of the U.S. cabinet
argued that the German leaders should be executed without trial.
President Roosevelt initially subscribed to this position, and it almost
prevailed. 1 ' In the end, however, Roosevelt (and later President
Truman) became convinced that trials-rather than extra-judicial
executions-would better secure the restoration of the rule of law to
Germany. The Americans persuaded the other Allies to convene a
tribunal instead of a firing squad. Major architects of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, particularly U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson,
hoped to use the Tribunal to prove the illegality of the German
decision to go to war and, by so doing, help construct a legal regime
that would discourage future leaders from turning to war instead of
diplomacy to resolve political conflicts. 12
As the chief proponent of the Nuremberg proceedings, the
United States dominated the subsequent trial, contributing vast sums
10. Countries may voluntarily decide to apply the laws of war to internal conflicts, but they
are not obligated to do so.
11.

GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

154 (2000).
12.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 174-78 (Harvard

U. Press 1986).
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of money, logistical support, and intellectual firepower to the
enterprise. U.S. officials also led the effort to establish and direct a
similar proceeding for the Japanese leaders, which would become
13
known as the Tokyo Tribunal.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals largely followed the plans
of their U.S. architects. The trials saw the conviction of many of the
defendants on charges of war crimes arising out of violations of the
Geneva and Hague Conventions. Although these treaties made no
mention of criminal punishment, the judges had little difficulty
finding that there was individual criminal responsibility under
customary international law. Jackson's broader ideological point also
found a receptive audience in the tribunals' judges. They convicted
several of the defendants at Nuremberg and Tokyo of the crime of
aggressive war. The U.S. judge from the Nuremberg Tribunal, former
U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle, triumphantly declared that
"aggressive war was once romantic; now it is criminal."'14
B. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The horrors of World War II led not only to the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals, but also to a drive to rewrite the laws of war. This
process culminated in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
negotiated in the spring and summer of 1949 by representatives from
fifty-nine states. 15 The delegates worked from draft texts that had
been authored by the ICRC in consultation with states.
At the Diplomatic Conference, the debates centered on how to
balance the needs of state security with the humanitarian desire to
mitigate the harms of war. The records of the Conference reveal that
many of the delegates were concerned about the possibility of future
conflicts, both at home and abroad. As one of the reports authored by
a key committee at the Diplomatic Conference notes, "[T]he Draft
prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross ...

aimed

as one might expect at humanitarian guarantees on the broadest

13.

YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

61 (1999); Allison Marston Danner, Beyond the Geneva Conventions: Lessons from the Tokyo
Tribunal in Prosecuting War and Terrorism 6-11 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 05-26, 2005), available at http://ssrn.
comabstract=784668.
14. Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 39, 72 (1947)
(quoting Francis Biddle, Prosecution of Major Nazi War Criminals, 15 DEP'T ST. BULL. 954, 956
(1946)).
15. JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE

TREATMENT OF PRISONS OF WAR 6 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1:1

possible scale." 16 From the perspective of the governments assembled
in Geneva, however, "[i]t was to be foreseen that ... questions would
not always appear in the same light, and aspirations towards the
safeguarding of humanity in the stress of war would be mingled with
preoccupations concerning collective defense, war necessities and the
needs of security." 17 The preoccupation with state security appeared
most forcefully in the debate over whether the new treaties should
apply to civil wars.
1. Scope
The pre-1949 treaties governing the laws of war apply only to
conflicts occurring between states-in other words, to international
conflicts. The draft texts of the Geneva Conventions submitted by the
ICRC to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference similarly provided that the
new treaties would apply to any armed conflict between two or more of
the states that had ratified the treaties.1 8 The ICRC, however, had a
more ambitious agenda. The drafts included a provision that would
have revolutionized the laws of war by extending the treaties to civil
wars. 19 By limiting how states could treat rebel fighters and hostile
civilians in civil wars, this change would have had a significant impact
on how countries could address domestic rebellions. The ICRC's push
to extend the scope of the rules, however, was premature. In 1949, the
human rights revolution was in its infancy. No other body of law at
the time placed such limits on states' conduct of their internal affairs.
Even the ICRC recognized that this provision was more than states
were willing to swallow. During the Conference a delegate from the
ICRC acknowledged that this provision "had no chance whatever of
20
being adopted by Governments."
The question of whether to apply the Geneva Conventions to
civil wars divided the victorious Allies.
The coalitions of those
16. Draft Report of Committee III to Plenary Assembly, 3 FINAL RECORD OF THE
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 app. 402 at 183 (1949) [hereinafter 3 1949
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE]. This Report was not actually adopted by the Committee, but the
discussion of it by the committee suggests that the reason for its non-adoption was that delegates
were concerned with its frankness. See 2A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF

GENEVA OF 1949 at 807 (1949) ("[T]he Committee's Report... must be completely objective in
character.").
17. 3 1949 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 183.
18. See, e.g., Draft Convention for the Relief of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, 1 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 at 47 art. 2

(1949).
19.

DE PREUX ETAL., supra note 15, at 31.

20. 2B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 337 (1949)
[hereinafter 2B 1949 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
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supporting and opposed to this development were a study in irony.
Overcoming the looming chill of the Cold War, both the United States
and the Soviet Union supported extending the laws of war to civil
wars. 21 The United States had little concern that it would face a
repetition of its own civil war. At the Diplomatic Conference, the
Soviet Union took a forcefully humanitarian line on virtually all of the
issues discussed-a strategy, one suspects, designed to put its
erstwhile allies in the uncomfortable position of having to argue the
anti-humanitarian, pro-security position.
Those opposed to the extension of the draft rules to civil wars
included the colonial powers, particularly the British and the French,
as well as the newly-liberated former colonies. 22 The United Kingdom,
for example, stated in the negotiations that the application of the
treaties to civil war "would strike at the root of national sovereignty
and endanger national security."23 The newly-independent states
were also concerned about their authority to quash rebellions. Of all
the delegates, the Burmese representative was most emphatic on the
issue of internal security. He warned that "the Eastern countries he
represented... could not agree to an extension of the Conventions to
civil war, and if such a provision were included, they would not be able
to sign the Conventions."24 He later asserted that "[i]nternal matters
25
cannot be ruled by international law."
The delegates debated various solutions to the problem of civil
wars.
Some delegates advocated that the rules governing
international conflicts apply only to civil wars of particular intensity
or duration. 26 In the end, the Conference agreed upon a single
provision on civil wars that would appear in all four treaties. In the
final texts, the article on civil wars appears as the third provision in
each treaty and is usually referred to as common Article 3. It states:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
21.
22.

Id. at 12-14; GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 at 177 (1994).
BEST, supra note 21, at 173-74.

23. 2B 1949 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 20, at 10.
24. Id. at 102.
25. Id. at 330.
26. The United States, for example, made such a suggestion. Id. at 12 ("The United States
of America therefore considered that the Convention should be applicable only where the parent
government had extended recognition to the rebels or where those conditions obtained which
would warrant other States in recognizing the belligerency of the rebels whether or not such
recognition was accorded by the Power on which they depend in this latter eventuality."). The
various proposals are described in Frederic Siordet, The Geneva Conventions and Civil War, in
III REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA CROIX ROUGE, supp. 11, at 201-18 (Oct. 1950).
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following provisions..
,,27 The ensuing provisions prohibit a number
of activities, including murder and torture. 28 Apart from common
Article 3, the rest of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply only
to wars between signatories of the Geneva Conventions and to
29
occupations of any signatory state.
While the humanitarian purpose of common Article 3 is clear,
30
its text is couched in the language of "affectionate generalities."
What, exactly, is an "armed conflict not of an international character"?
Does any use of military force trigger the provision's application, or
does it require hostilities of a certain scale or duration? The treaties
do not address these critical questions.
2. Enforcement
With common Article 3, the delegates in 1949 placed some
restrictions on civil wars, although only in a vaguely worded provision
with no enforcement mechanism. States were willing to go further
with regard to the enforcement of the rules governing international
conflicts.
One of the most important innovations of the 1949
Conventions was the development of the so-called grave-breach
system. Unlike the earlier treaties, which make no mention of
individual criminal responsibility, the 1949 Geneva Conventions
require states to incorporate penal provisions for certain violations,
described in the treaties as "grave breaches," into their domestic
criminal codes. Signatories are required to either prosecute any
individuals suspected of committing grave breaches or to extradite
them to a state that wishes to prosecute them, no matter where in the
31
world the grave breach is committed.
Although the innovative grave-breach provisions were
developed by the ICRC with the assistance of individual experts
without state involvement, 32 they were generally embraced with
enthusiasm at the Diplomatic Conference. This support, however,
27. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1949
Geneva Convention I].
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., id. art 2.
30. David P. Forsythe, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on NonInternationalArmed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 272, 273 (1978) (quoting TOM J. FARER, THE
LAWS OF WAR 25 YEARS AFTER NUREMBERG 31 (1971)).

31. See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, arts. 49-50 (defining grave breaches
and providing for the prosecution and extradition of persons suspected of committing them).
32. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REVISED AND NEW DRAFT
CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: REMARKS AND PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 5-6 (Feb. 1949).
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extended only to the possibility of domestic prosecutions of gravebreach violations. The delegates at the Conference went to great
lengths to ensure that the new enforcement scheme would not form
part of any broader effort to develop international criminal law.
The initial proposal made by the ICRC for the grave-breach
provisions provided that the grave breaches "shall be punished.., by
the tribunals of any of the High Contracting Parties or by any
international jurisdiction, the competence of which has been
recognised by them." 33 The accompanying commentary stated that
"[aln international tribunal would doubtless be the instrument best
34
qualified to judge" whether grave breaches had been committed.
Given the success of the recent Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the
ICRC appeared to assume that the delegates would support an
international court for war crimes. Indeed, the Genocide Convention,
drafted in 1948, states that the crime of genocide can be punished in
the country where the crime was committed or "by such international
35
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction."
States, however, were unenthusiastic about an international
court for war crimes and stripped all references to it from the draft
text early in the Diplomatic Conference. The British, who had been
dubious about the Nuremberg proceedings from their inception, took
the lead in ensuring the speedy demise of a permanent war crimes
tribunal. 36 In the final text of the treaty, the grave-breach provisions
provide only for domestic prosecution of acts prohibited by the 1949
Geneva Conventions. While the ICRC's commentary on the treaties
optimistically observed that "there is nothing in the paragraph to
exclude the handing over of the accused to an international penal
tribunal,"37 the Diplomatic Conference was clearly opposed to vesting
such powers in an international institution. There is no record in the
debates of any state advocating such a position.
C. The 1977 Additional Protocols
The phrase "human rights" was rarely mentioned in the 1949
Diplomatic Conference.3 8 The post-World War II period, however, saw
33. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 21.
35. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide art. 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
36.

BEST, supra note 21, at 162-63.

37. JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY: I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 366 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,

1952).
38.

BEST, supra note 21, at 145.
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great development in the human rights movement and the drafting of
many new treaties that address states' treatment of their citizens. In
1968, the International Conference on Human Rights at Tehran called
for the revision of the Geneva and Hague Conventions "to assure the
better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed
conflicts." 39 The latter phrase was a clear reference to the failure of
the existing treaties to address civil wars.
In response, the ICRC in consultation with experts and
government representatives, drafted two treaties for the purpose of
enhancing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and extending some of their
provisions to civil wars.
These treaties were the subject of a
Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Federal Council in
February 1974.40 Although the 1949 Conventions were drafted in a
single year, the 1974 conference included many more states and was
far more divisive. It convened for three yearly sessions, concluding in
1977. Many newly independent former colonies were among the 155
states that met in Geneva, and the conference was split by NorthSouth tensions. 41 This cleavage was reflected in the reprise of debates
that had occurred in 1949 and resurfaced in the negotiation of the
Additional Protocols.
1. Scope
In the 1974 Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC sought to update,
clarify, and extend the rules governing both international and noninternational armed conflicts. It proposed two different treaties: a
fairly elaborate set of rules that would apply to international armed
conflicts (called Additional Protocol I), and a shorter draft that would
apply to non-international armed conflicts (called Additional Protocol
II). The first article of Additional Protocol I incorporated the principal
jurisdictional provision of the 1949 Conventions (known as common
Article 2),42 which limits the application of the treaties to

39. MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY
ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 39 (1982)

(emphasis added).
40. Id. at 4; CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JULY 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 xxxii (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987).
41.

BEST, supra note 21, at 343-44; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 39, at 7-8.

42. Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Draft Additional
Protocol 1], art. 1, I OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS
GENEVA (1974-1977) pt. 3 at 3 (1978) [hereinafter I 1974-77 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
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international conflicts and to territorial occupations. 43 The first
article of the draft of Additional Protocol II stated that this new treaty
would apply to all other armed conflicts as long as they "tak[e] place
between armed forces or other organized armed groups under
44
responsible command."
This scheme was the subject of heated debate in the early
sessions of the Diplomatic Conference. The 1974 meeting took place
at the height of developing countries' legal activism surrounding the
New World
Economic
Order
and
associated
anti-colonial
developments. Developing countries insisted that "wars of national
liberation" (which were generally treated under the 1949 Conventions
as civil wars) be described as international armed conflicts and subject
to the more elaborate rules entailed by this body of law. By describing
these conflicts as "international," fighters for the rebel groups would
be entitled to prisoner of war status, afforded protections granted to
combatants and civilians under the 1949 Conventions, and guaranteed
any other securities contained in the revised treaties.
Referring to the draft text of Additional Protocol I prepared by
the ICRC (which did not classify wars of national liberation as
international conflicts), the delegate from Tanzania declared that "his
delegation was not prepared to accept a humanitarian law drawn up
solely in the interest of the imperialist Powers." 45 Many developing
countries echoed this sentiment, as did all of the socialist countries.
Most of the Western powers, including the United Kingdom, France,
the United States, and Italy, argued that wars of national liberation
should fall under the less expansive Additional Protocol 11.46
In the key committee that examined the question of the scope
of Additional Protocol I, the developing countries were victorious,
ensuring that the Protocol governing international conflicts would also
apply to wars of national liberation. 4 7 Those voting in favor were
developing countries, including China, India, and Egypt, as well as the

43. See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 2 ("[T]he present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict.... The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party ... ").
44. Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, I 1974-77 DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE, supra note 42, pt. 3 at 33.
45. VIII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS

GENEVA (1974-1977) at 20 (1978) [hereinafter VIII 1974-77 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
46. Id. at 13-22.
47. Id. at 102.
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socialist block countries and the Soviet Union. 48 Those voting against
included the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Israel, Italy
and Japan. 49 The final text of Additional Protocol I states that it
applies to all conflicts covered by the earlier 1949 Conventions and
"armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist r~gimes in the
' 50
exercise of their right of self-determination."
The developing countries that voted to expand Additional
Protocol I were largely hostile to Additional Protocol II, the proposed
treaty on civil wars. Having won the political battle to elevate the
status of anti-colonial and liberation struggles, they were adamantly
opposed to the idea of granting international rights-and
international legal legitimacy-to potential rebels and their
supporters.
Concerned about domestic security, these states
emphatically did not want to tie their hands in cases of potential
rebellions. Most developing countries proposed either rejecting the
treaty on civil wars altogether 51 or inserting a high jurisdictional
threshold to ensure its infrequent application.
Despite the tensions of the Cold War, the Western and socialist
powers largely supported a broad scope for Additional Protocol II.
Having lost control of their colonial empires, the United Kingdom and
France were no longer adverse to extending the protection of the laws
of war to civil wars. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the
United Kingdom, among others, advocated retaining the broad
52
language of the ICRC's draft.
The Diplomatic Conference finally settled upon language that
imposed a high jurisdictional threshold for the application of
Additional Protocol II that was more demanding than both the ICRC
draft text and the vague language of common Article 3 of the 1949
Conventions.
The drafting committee chairman noted that this
provision "represented a very fragile consensus reached only after
48. Id. Norway was the only developed country not part of the socialist block to vote in favor
of the proposal. Id.
49. Id. A disparate collection of countries, including Ireland, Australia, Burma, and
Colombia, abstained. Id.
50. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
51. This, for example, was the position of India. VII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS GENEVA (1974-1977) at 72 (1978) [hereinafter VII 197477 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
52.

VIII

1974-77

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 45, at 236,

287, 292.

Some

countries, like Canada, expressed support for an even more expanded scope of coverage. Id. at
205-06.
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lengthy consideration." 53 In the end, the vote in the committee was
fifty-eight in favor of the provision, four against, and twenty-nine
abstaining. All of the countries opposing the treaty on civil wars were
from the developing world. 54 Although powerful countries like the
United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union supported the treaty on
civil wars, they were not interested enough in the issue to press it
vigorously. Indeed, Additional Protocol II was almost abandoned
altogether at the conference, but it was rescued by a last-minute
proposal from Pakistan that saved the Protocol by stripping out most
55
of its provisions.
2. Enforcement
No state, and not even the ICRC, proposed inserting the
enforcement system provided by the grave-breach regime into the
rules for civil wars. In fact, the final text of Additional Protocol II
contains no enforcement mechanism at all, other than the vapid
suggestion that the Protocol "shall be disseminated as widely as
56
possible."
The draft text of Additional Protocol I, governing international
armed conflicts, did reaffirm the grave-breach system of the 1949
Conventions. 57 Although the grave-breach system had been an almost
complete failure since its inception in 1949 due to lack of state will to
prosecute violations, no state suggested making substantive changes
to it. As had been the case in 1949, there was near consensus that the
Geneva Conventions should not be subject to enforcement in an
international court. 58 Even the ICRC did not advocate such a step,
although it was recommended to them by several experts. 59 Some
states, including the United States, focused on improving the
"protecting power" component of the Geneva Conventions, which grant
third states or organizations the authority to oversee compliance with
the Geneva Conventions in international conflicts.6 0 The protecting
power provisions, however, make no mention of criminal punishment.
53.
54.

VII 1974-77 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supranote 51, at 66.
Norway also voted with the developing countries. Id.

55.

BOTHE ET AL., supra note 39, at 606.

56. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 19, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
616 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
57. Draft Additional Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 74.
58. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 39, at 512.
59.

Id. at 507.

60.

See, e.g., L. C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 244-46 (2d ed.

2000) (describing protecting power provisions).
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The Geneva Conventions have not been renegotiated since
1977. Furthermore, because they have not been subject to judicial
elaboration through caselaw, the laws of war have remained in the
abstract, vague, and sometimes contradictory language negotiated by
the delegates in 1949 and 1977.61 The relative weakness of the laws of
war with regard to civil wars is particularly problematic. The number
of ongoing civil wars in the post-1945 period dwarfed the number of
inter-state conflicts, and over twenty-five million people died in civil
wars in this period. 62 Although the grave-breach regime on paper
appeared to be a robust enforcement mechanism, in fact "this noble
innovation has achieved nothing."63 States have demonstrated that
they rarely possess the political will to prosecute violations of the laws
of war, particularly large-scale violations.
This state of affairs
changed dramatically after the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia in the
1990s.
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL, THE RWANDAN
TRIBUNAL, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. The Establishment of the ICTY
When Yugoslavia began to spiral into civil war in 1991, the
United Nations Security Council had emerged from the Cold War
paralysis of the previous forty years. The reinvigorated Council,
however, proved ineffectual at stopping the bloodshed in Yugoslavia or
at halting the atrocities. In July 1992, reporters began filing stories
chronicling death camps that revived memories of Nazi Germany.
Numerous NGOs and international organizations reported mass
rapes, killings, and torture committed in Bosnia. 64 The Security
Council's attempts to fashion political solutions to the conflict and to
discourage the commission of atrocities through economic and military
sanctions fell flat. 65 Individuals from prominent NGOs, leading
61.

See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. CHI.L. REV. 297, 308 (2003).

62. See ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WEAK
STATES, AND THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WARS 2-4 (2005); Meredith Reid Sarkees, The

Correlatesof War Data on War: An Update to 1997, in 18 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 123,
134-43 (2000) (classifying wars by type).
63. BEST, supra note 21, at 396.
64.

JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE

TRIBUNAL 33 (2003).
65. Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes
Tribunals,55 INT'L ORG. 655, 662 (2001).
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political figures, and organizations associated with the United Nations
called for the establishment of an international tribunal, modeled on
the Nuremberg Tribunal, to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes
66
committed in Yugoslavia.
In September 1992, the German foreign minister, Klaus
Kinkel, formally introduced the idea of an international war crimes
tribunal to the United Nations General Assembly. 67 In January 1993,
His U.N.
President Clinton took office in the United States.
idea of a
the
about
Ambassador, Madeline Albright, was enthusiastic
6
8
tribunal. Heading off a rival U.S. proposal, France officially brought
the idea of a tribunal to the Security Council early in 1993. Privately,
however, key French officials were opposed to the idea, fearing that it
would endanger French troops serving as peacekeepers in Bosnia and
69 The British opposed
hamper the European-led peace 7negotiations.
0
grounds.
the tribunal on the same
The United States, which refused to send troops but did want
to respond to the Bosnian crisis in some way, pushed for a tribunal.
The United States persuaded China and Russia to go along with the
idea. Pakistan, then serving on the Security Council, pressed for the
tribunal on behalf of other Muslim countries as a show of support to
the beleaguered Bosnians. 7 1 When increasing publicity about ongoing
atrocities highlighted the failure of the Security Council's political
efforts, 72 members of the Security Council acquiesced to the proposals
for a tribunal. On February 22, 1993, the Council passed a resolution
declaring that it would establish an international tribunal for
73
Yugoslavia.
The decision to create a tribunal, however, did nothing to
clarify the details of the institution. The Security Council had never
used its authority over breaches of international peace (which gave it
jurisdiction over the events in Yugoslavia) to create a court. It
delegated the politically sensitive task of creating the statute to
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Working

66. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 51 (1997); Rudolph, supra note 65, at 660-62.
67. PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 23 (James Snyder trans.,
2004).

68.
69.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 35.

70.

BASS, supra note 11, at 211.

71.

HAZAN, supra note 67, at 37.

72.
73.

Id. at 14.
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S[RES/808 (February 22, 1993).
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under intense time pressure, the secretary-general drafted a statute
7 4
on the basis of suggested texts provided by states and NGOs.
The final text of the statute was appended to an explanatory
report presented by the secretary-general to the Security Council. It
gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
and-of particular relevance here-grave breaches, as defined by the
1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of
war. In light of the prior history of the development of the laws of
war, this decision was revolutionary.
For the first time since
Nuremberg and Tokyo, an international court was endowed with the
authority to punish violations of the laws of war. A step that had been
steadfastly resisted by delegates at the Diplomatic Conferences in
1949 and 1974-77 was, in the press of events in 1993, embraced by the
Security Council almost without comment.
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council officially discussed the
secretary-general's report, as well as Resolution 827. The text of
Resolution 827 set out the goals of the Tribunal in its preamble and
adopted the statute proposed by the secretary-general. The Council
approved the text of Resolution 827 as drafted, thus accepting the
report and the statute without amendment.7 5 The preamble to
Resolution 827 and its discussion in the Security Council identified
three principal goals for the tribunal: ending the commission of war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia, punishing persons responsible for
those crimes, and breaking the cycle of ethnic violence that had made
76
the perpetration of those crimes possible.
The discussion of Resolution 827 in the Security Council shed
light on the various members' understanding of the ICTY. China,
which was still privately opposed to the ICTY, 77 stated that the
Tribunal "shall not constitute any precedent."7 8 Many delegates took
a different tack, suggesting that the creation of the ICTY confirmed
the need for a permanent institution devoted to international criminal
law. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and

74. These are collected in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 209-480 (1995) [hereinafter 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, YUGOSLAVIA].

75. Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Policy-OrientedLaw in the InternationalCriminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, in MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN 889, 890 (L.C. Vohrah et al. eds.,
2003).

76. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); see SCHARF, supra note 66, at 215.
77. See David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401, 410-11 (1994) (discussing China and Brazil's reluctance to openly
oppose the Tribunal's creation).
78. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 34, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (cited in
SCHARF, supranote 66, at 228).
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France expressed this view. 79 Several representatives indicated that
the Tribunal must act, and be seen to act, independently of the
80
Security Council.
Many delegates asserted that the Tribunals could not create
new law. The representative of Venezuela, which at the time held the
Presidency of the Security Council, underlined that the Tribunal, "as a
subsidiary organ of the Council, would not be empowered with-nor
would the Council be assuming-the ability to set down norms of
international law or to legislate with respect to those rights. It simply
applies existing international humanitarian law."81 In his report, the
secretary-general declared that the "principle nullum crimen sine lege
requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of
customary law."8 2 In fact, the statute as drafted by the secretarygeneral was more conservative than some states on the Security
Council advocated. The United States, for example, had proposed that
the statute specifically reference the Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions; the secretary-general did not include them,
83
presumably because of their uncertain customary law status.
Although the ICTY Statute left many of the details of crimes
vague, representatives on the Council made few comments on issues of
substantive law. This silence partially reflected an unwillingness to
reopen sensitive questions resolved by the secretary-general's
proposed draft. Prior to the discussion of Resolution 827, the United
States lobbied for the Council to approve the statute without
amendment and encouraged states to offer "interpretive" comments
during the discussion.8 4 A few states-all permanent members of the

79. See SCHARF, supra note 66, at 228. Russia and France made these comments in the
context of the ICTR. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter

ICTR Debate], reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 298, 300 (1998).

80.

SCHARF, THE

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993), reprintedin 2

MORRIS & SCHARF, YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 74, at 178, 194 (statement of Japan), 203 (statement

of Spain). These assertions of independence most likely sprang from concerns about the charge of
victors' justice that had shadowed the legacy of the International Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo.
81.

2 MORRIS & SCHARF, YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 74, at 182. The United Kingdom, Brazil,

and Spain made similar statements. Id. at 190, 202, 204.
82. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph I of
Security Council Resolution 808,

34, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/25704 (May

3, 1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report I] (emphasis added).
83. See SCHARF, supra note 66, at 58-59.
84. 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 33-

34 (1995).
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Council-took advantage of this opportunity.
Their comments,
however, did not tackle the details of the statute.
Only Canada, which was not a member of the Security Council
but did submit a proposal for the Tribunal's statute to the secretarygeneral, argued for more specifics. Canada urged that the Security
Council set out the exact offenses under the laws of war that would
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICTY as well as the mental states
that the prosecutor would have to prove.8 5 No other state took this
approach, and it is not reflected in the final statute. With the
exception of the Canadian proposal, none of the public records relating
to the ICTY Statute reveal any qualms with investing such discretion
in an international court. Instead, members of the Security Council
emphasized the Tribunal's independence. The contrast between the
Security Council's discussion of the content of the ICTY Statute and
the painstaking negotiations over the Geneva Conventions at the
Diplomatic Conferences of 1949 and 1974-77 could not be more stark.
The reason for what was, in retrospect, a remarkable amount
of insouciance with respect to the Tribunal's lawmaking authority is
readily apparent. Because of the court's limited jurisdiction, no state
sitting on the Council expected any of its nationals to be tried before
the ICTY.8 6 In addition, in 1993 and 1994, the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court was far from assured.
Although members of the Council were aware of the potential
precedential value of the ICTY, they did not treat it as a full dress
rehearsal for an international criminal court.
B. The Decision to Establish the ICTR
Atrocities soon flared up thousands of miles from Yugoslavia.
In April 1994, civil war broke out in Rwanda, and, by the end of June,
800,000 Rwandan citizens were dead.8 7 Again, the Security Council
did nothing to stop the bloodshed. The new Rwandan government

85. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations to the
Secretary-General,
8, (April 14, 1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, YUGOSLAVIA, supra
note 74, at 459, 460.
86. The ICTY has jurisdiction only over acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 1, 3-4, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statuteindex.htm [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
87. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES 132-33 (1998).
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called for the establishment of an ICTY-like institution for Rwanda.88
The Security Council was anxious not to be seen as more concerned
about events in Europe than in Africa and quickly agreed to the
89
establishment of another tribunal.
The ICTR Statute was modeled closely on that of the ICTY. 90
It grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over the events occurring in 1994 in
Rwanda and in "neighbouring States." 91 The ICTY Statute does not
clarify whether the fighting in Yugoslavia constituted international
conflict or a civil war, a question pivotal to the application of the laws
of war. Unlike the ICTY Statute, the war crimes provision for the
ICTR Statute applies explicitly to civil wars by referencing both
common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II of 1977. 92 There is little legislative history for the ICTR
Statute, so it is not clear on what basis the Security Council made the
determination that customary international law provides for
individual criminal responsibility in civil wars.
When considered in light of the negotiations of the Geneva
Conventions, the war crimes provision of the ICTR Statute is
revolutionary. During the Diplomatic Conferences in 1949 and 197477, no state suggested that the articles on civil war should include
individual criminal responsibility. Indeed, these treaties established
no enforcement mechanisms at all for civil wars. Even the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals, which both adjudicated crimes committed in
international conflicts, provided no precedent for this step.
The discussion of the ICTR in the Security Council, however,
made little reference to the novelty of the ICTR's work. The French
representative blandly noted that the ad hoc tribunals can "provide
international penal experience which will be useful for the
establishment of a future permanent court."93 Argentina highlighted
that the tribunal was "not authorized to establish rules of
international law or to legislate as regards such law but, rather, it is
88. See United Press International, Rwanda Wants Trial of Genocide Suspects, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Aug. 9, 1994; Agence France Press English Wire, UN Should Extend Mandate of
Crimes Tribunal to Rwanda: CIJ,AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 2, 1994.

89.

Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the

InternationalCriminal Court, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
3, 14 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter 1 THE ROME STATUTE].

90. Unlike the case with the ICTY, the secretary-general did not draft the ICTR Statute. It
was drafted principally by representatives of the United States and New Zealand. 1 VIRGINIA
MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RwANDA 101 n.466

(1998).
91. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1, available at
http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
92. Id. art. 4.
93. ICTR Debate, supra note 79, at 300.
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to apply existing international law." 94 In light of the ground-breaking
nature of the idea of the international prosecution of crimes
committed in civil wars, this statement was either breathtakingly
disingenuous or profoundly ill-informed.
C. The Early Years of the ICTY and ICTR
The Security Council's establishment of the Tribunals,
however, did not ensure the courts' success. Indeed, several members
of the P-5 were privately hostile to their existence. Although these
states could not directly attack their new creation, they could
vanquish the Tribunal in a war of attrition.
The ICTY's first
president, Antonio Cassese, observed that the states on the Council
could "paralyze" the court by refusing to make arrests. He remarked
that "a tribunal without defendants, without trials, would cost a
'95
fortune and produce nothing of value.
The ICTY's early years were particularly rocky. In July 1993,
an article appeared in the Washington Post entitled Where's the War
Crimes Court? It noted that no prosecutor had been chosen, no judge
nominated, and no defendant named. 96 In fact, it took eighteen
months to select a prosecutor in a process that was "a protracted,
politicized fiasco." 97
The Tribunal had insufficient funds and
personnel. Arresting indicted suspects was an acute problem. France
and Britain had peacekeepers serving in Bosnia and worried that
their troops would be subject to retaliation if they apprehend indicted
individuals. 98 Serbia and Croatia, where many of the suspects were
living, refused to cooperate with the Tribunal.
By 1996, the
peacekeepers on the ground in Yugoslavia had not made a single
arrest. 99 By 1997, only seven people were in custody,'0 0 and most of
those had surrendered voluntarily to the Tribunal. The judges
threatened to resign. Although it had introduced the resolution
establishing the ICTY, France stonewalled the Tribunal and provided
no support to the institution. 1° 1 In 1997, the French defense minister

94. Id. at 303.
95. HAZAN, supra note 67, at 69.
96. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Where's the War Crimes Court?, WASH. POST, July 30, 1993, at
A21.
97. BASS, supranote 11, at 217, 219.
98. Id. at 216.
99. Id. at 248.
100. Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans, 76 FOREIGN AFF.
2, 5 (1997).
101. BASS, supra note 11, at 222.
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labeled the ICTY a "circus."' 0 2 The United States stepped in to
support the Tribunal, providing twenty-two prosecutors and
investigators to the understaffed prosecutor's office. 10 3 The United
States also lent financial support, contributing $3 million to develop a
10 4
computer system.
The appointment in 1996 of the Canadian judge Louise Arbour
as the Tribunal's second prosecutor marked the beginning of a shift in
the Tribunal's political fortunes. Arbour began issuing secret arrest
warrants,'0 5
and held a press conference at which she publicly
disclosed that France was failing to cooperate with the Tribunal-a
charge that France heatedly denied. 06 Tony Blair was elected prime
minister of the United Kingdom in 1997. Blair's foreign secretary,
Robin Cook, championed an "ethical foreign policy,"'1 7 and Blair
instructed his government to begin cooperating with the Tribunal. In
1999, Secretary Cook provided the ICTY with what he described as
"the biggest handover of British intelligence to an outside agency in
history."'08 The ICTY gradually gained in strength and resources. By
2004, the Tribunals' annual expenditures constituted 15 percent of the
entire U.N. budget. 109
Compared with the ICTY, the ICTR's early years were less
contentious. By the time of the Tribunal's establishment, the conflict
in Rwanda was largely over. The permanent members of the Security
Council had little at stake in the country, and many of the ICTR's
suspects were apprehended easily.
The ICTR was plagued by
corruption scandals and charges of incompetence. Nevertheless, itunlike the ICTY-did not expose the ambivalence among the members
of the Council about the wisdom of international criminal
accountability.
D. The Tribunals' Transformationof the Laws of War
During the period of the ICTY's greatest political weakness, its
judges issued a surprising series of decisions that effected a
102. HAZAN,supranote 67, at 100.
103. Id. at 52.
104. HAGAN, supra note 64, at 70.
105. See id. at 129; HAZAN, supranote 67, at 95; Louise Arbour, The Crucial Years, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 396, 397 (2004).
106. HAGAN, supra note 64, at 129.

107. See, e.g., Tackling World Poverty, THE GUARDIAN, May 29, 1997, at 18 (describing
Cook's "ethical foreign policy").
108. HAGAN, supra note 64, at 121.

109. The Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, 42, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004).
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fundamental transformation in the laws of war. Writing in 1990, one
scholar lamented that the laws of war were regarded by many as
"esoteric" and "irrelevant."' 11 0 In a 1998 article entitled War Crimes
Law Comes of Age, Theodor Meron asserted that the laws of war had
developed faster since the beginning of the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia than in the forty-five years after the Nuremberg
Tribunals."1
He credited this revolution in significant part to the
2
jurisprudence of the Tribunals."
This early burst of activity belies the conventional wisdom that
international courts' decisions exhibit caution at the beginning of the
courts' life and then get progressively bolder. "1 3 In the case of the
Tribunals, the most far-reaching decisions on the laws of war were
made in the earliest cases.
The Tribunals' most revolutionary decisions addressed the
fundamental issues that divided the delegates at the Diplomatic
Conferences in 1949 and 1974-77 on the scope of the laws of warnamely, whether the rules should address civil wars and how to
distinguish between international conflicts and civil wars. The ICTY
judiciary had the difficult task of applying, and refining, the key
phrases from the Geneva Conventions relating to the scope of the
treaties. In light of the chaotic conditions surrounding the dissolution
of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, it was not obvious whether to describe the
violence as a single or multiple wars and, if multiple, whether the
conflicts had been "internationalized" such that the rules governing
international conflicts would apply. Furthermore, it was not clear
whether customary international law included individual criminal
responsibility for violations committed during non-international
armed conflicts at all. The provisions in the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols that addressed non-international armed
conflicts deliberately made no mention of criminal punishment.

110. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY,
ARMED CONFLICTS vii (1990).

INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN

LAW:

THE REGULATION

OF

111. See Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 462, 463 (1998).
112. Id. at 464.
113. The European Court of Human Rights and the quasi-judicial European Commission of
Human Rights, for example, behaved cautiously in their early cases. See J. G. MERRILLS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 71-81 (2d

ed. 1993) (describing the court's methods of interpretation); J. G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 264 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that in the early years of the Commission, most applications
were declared inadmissible); Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the
TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357,
408-09 (1998).-
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The most important law-of-war decision by the ICTY was
issued in its first full case, Prosecutor v. Tadic. In Tadic, the court
considered whether the Security Council had limited the ICTY's
jurisdiction to international armed conflicts or whether its jurisdiction
extended to civil wars.' 14 In an amicus brief filed in Tadic, the United
States argued that the conflict in Yugoslavia was clearly an
international one, and that the members on the Security Council
viewed it as such when they established the Tribunal.' 15 The ICTY,
however, rejected the blanket classification of the wars in Yugoslavia
as international, stating that some may instead be civil wars. The
ICTY judges nevertheless concluded that the Security Council had
endowed the Tribunal with jurisdiction over both international and
16
non-international armed conflicts.
The court's conclusion that the Council had vested the ICTY
with jurisdiction over civil wars ran into a textual problem. The ICTY
Statute does not refer to any of the provisions or treaties governing
civil wars (namely common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II).
Indeed, there was clear evidence that the secretary-general
deliberately excluded any reference to them in the statute."1 7 As
enacted by the Security Council, the Tribunal's statute contains two
provisions related to war crimes: Article 2 covers grave breaches of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 3 refers to "violations of the
laws and customs of war." In a decision that will be discussed further
below, the Tadic court first decided that, because of its references to
the grave-breach regime, Article 2 applied only to offenses committed
in international conflicts. The Court then turned its attention to the
statute's other provision on the violations of the laws of war, Article 3.
The introductory language (often referred to as the "chapeau")
of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute provides that "[t]he International
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws
or customs of war." It further states that "[s]uch violations shall

114. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction,
71 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty
/tadic/appealldecision-e/51002.htm [hereinafter Tadic Il]. The Trial Chamber had also considered
this question and found that the Tribunal's jurisdiction extended to international and noninternational armed conflicts. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction, Trial Chamber I
53, 58 (Aug. 10, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895.htm [hereinafter Tadic 1].
115. Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain
Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v.
Dusan Tadic, at 33 (July 17, 1995) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief in Tadic 1].
116. Tadic II, supra note 114, 72.
117. Larry D. Johnson, Ten Years Later: Reflections on the Drafting, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
368, 370 (2004).
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include, but not be limited to" a series of acts taken from the 1907
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land. 118 These acts include, for example, the "wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity."' 119 Hague Law, as exemplified by this provision, regulates
the means and methods of conducting military operations in armed
conflict.120 The Hague Convention makes no reference to criminal
responsibility.
The defense in Tadic made a strong case that Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute was limited to violations of Hague law. The language of
the secretary-general's report referred only to violations of Hague law
in its discussion of this provision. 12 1 The report did not reference the
Geneva Conventions with regard to this provision, and the secretarygeneral pointedly excluded a reference to Additional Protocol II from
the text of the ICTY Statute. Writing soon after the Security Council
enacted the ICTY Statute, a lawyer from the United Nations Office of
Legal Counsel involved in the drafting of the statute described the
ICTY's war crimes jurisdiction as "limited to the Geneva Conventions
1 22
of 1949 [and] the fourth Hague Convention."
Despite this evidence of the limited nature of Article 3, the
Appeals Chamber determined that the provision extended beyond
Hague Law to include "all violations of international humanitarian
law other than the 'grave breaches' of the four Geneva
Conventions." 123
The Appeals Chamber stated that Article 3
"functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious
violation of international humanitarian law is taken away from the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. Article 3 aims to make such
jurisdiction watertight and inescapable." 124 In so doing, the Appeals
Chamber effectively held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute

118. Secretary-General Report I, supra note 82,
119. ICTY Statute, supranote 86, art. 3(b).

41, 44.

120. GREEN, supra note 60, at 31.

121. Secretary-General Report I, supra note 82,
41-44.
122. Ralph Zacklin, Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 277, 280 (1993).
123. Tadic II, supra note 114,
87. The Appeals Chamber imposed four requirements for
finding a particular act to be a violation of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute:
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international
humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty
law, the required conditions must be met. . . ; (iii) the violation must be "serious" ... ;
[and] (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law,
the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.
Id.

94.
124. Id.

91.
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incorporated the laws of war that apply to civil wars, even though
there is no mention of the relevant provisions in the statute.
In the Tadic decision, therefore, the court found that it had
jurisdiction over offenses committed in civil wars under Article 3 of
the ICTY Statute, that the Security Council intended for the Tribunal
to prosecute these offenses, and that there was individual criminal
responsibility, as a matter of customary law, for violations of the laws
of war committed in civil wars. This understanding represented a
wholesale change from the limited enforcement scheme included in
the texts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols. William Schabas has written that, with the Tadic decision,
the Appeals Chamber "stunned international lawyers by issuing a
broad and innovative reading of the two war crimes of the ICTY
Statute."' 25 Later decisions by the ICTY found that certain crimes are
criminal under customary international law-even when committed in
non-international armed conflict.126
The Tadic court stated that the application of the laws of war
to civil wars was an outgrowth of the human rights movement of the
past forty years. It observed that "[a] State-sovereignty-oriented
approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented
approach."'127 The Court rhetorically asked,
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton
destruction of hospitals .. when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet
when armed
refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection
12 8
violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign State?

The Tadic court need not have taken such an expansive view.
All of the criminal acts for which Tadic stood accused were also
charged as crimes against humanity. Dismissal of the war crimes
charges, therefore, would not have acquitted Tadic of any conduct
described as criminal by the prosecution. Nonetheless, the Appeals
Chamber chose a much more aggressive approach, based both on the
court's perception that the Security Council intended to make its
jurisdiction "water-tight" and on its understanding of the "human
rights revolution" in international law.

125. WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 42
(2001).

126. See Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Decision on Motions for
147 (Trial Chamber
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/index.htm (finding
that "destruction or willful damage of institutions dedicated to religion" in non-international
armed conflict is a crime under customary international law).
127. Tadic II, supra note 114,
128. Id.

97.
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In contrast to the broad reading of Article 3, the Tadic court,
rendered a more conservative reading of Article 2 of its statute, which
references the grave-breach regime. In an amicus brief, the United
States argued that the grave-breach regime included common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions12 9-a position that was a highly
creative, and almost undoubtedly incorrect, interpretation of the 1949
treaties. The Appeals Chamber rejected the argument, although it
was careful to credit the United States' position.
The Appeals
Chamber concluded that Article 2 of the ICTY Statute applied only to
offenses committed in international armed conflict. 3 0 The court
placed particular weight on the decision by states in their negotiation
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to limit the grave-breach system to
international armed conflicts. 131 Although the Tadic court was clearly
sympathetic to the idea that the rules governing international armed
conflicts and civil wars should be the same, it would not fully
harmonize the twin regimes governing armed conflicts on its own
initiative. With this decision, the ICTY turned out to have a keen
sense of how far states would be willing to go. During the later
negotiations on the ICC treaty, states refused to merge the regimes
132
governing international and non-international armed conflicts.
Having established that the prosecution could charge Article 2
violations only if the acts occurred in international armed conflicts,
the Tadic court then resolved another key jurisdictional question: the
definition of "armed conflict." The text of the 1949 Conventions did
not address this seminal issue at all, and it was only partially resolved
by the Additional Protocols. The Appeals Chamber stated that "an
armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State."' 33 This definition, which implicitly applied both to
international conflicts and civil wars, was broader than either of those
provided in the Additional Protocols. It tacitly rejected the language
painstakingly negotiated by states in the Diplomatic Conference. In
fact, it closely resembled the ICRC's original proposed language for
Additional Protocol II that had been rejected at the Conference in
1974.134
129. U.S. Amicus Brief in Tadic I, supra note 115, at 35.
130. Tadic II, supra note 114, 84.
131. Id. 80.
132. See infra Part III(E)(1)(a).
133. Tadic II, supra note 114, 70.
134. The original proposed text had stated that Additional Protocol II would apply to all
armed conflicts not covered by Additional Protocol I, as long as they "tak[e] place between armed
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The Tadic Court also evinced a broad understanding of when a
seemingly internal conflict should be considered internationalized
because of the participation of another state. In Tadic, the court
considered what degree of control the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
would have needed to exert over the Bosnian Serbs in order to
internationalize the Bosnian civil war. At the time, the leading case
examining the relationship of third states to a rebel group located in
the territory of another state was the International Court of Justice's
decision in Nicaragua v. United States.' 35 In that case, the ICJ
considered whether the activities of the rebel Nicaraguan contras
could be attributable to the United States because it had funded and
trained the rebels. In Nicaragua, the ICJ found that funding and
training were not enough to engage the responsibility of the United
States.' 36 The Tadic court read the ICJ's decision to require that a
state had to issue "specific instructions" with regard to the unlawful
137
activity in order to make it responsible for that unlawful action.
In an act of surprising temerity for a newly-established
international institution, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic
declared the ICJ's decision to be "unconvincing."'138 Reviewing various
judicial precedents from institutions that included the Mexico-United
States General Claims Commission, the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, and a German domestic court, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
adopted a more permissive test. 13 9 It found that, in the circumstance
of involvement by a state in the activities of an organized armed group
acting in another state, the relevant test is not the ICJ's formulation
of "specific instructions" but instead whether the non-territorial state
exercised "overall control" of those forces in terms of the "planning and
140
supervision of military operations."'
The consequence of the Tadic decision is that the more
elaborate provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including
Geneva Convention IV on the treatment of civilians (which was at
forces or other organized armed groups under responsible command." Draft Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, art. 1, I 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference, supra note 42, pt. 3 at
33. [also cited in n. 44]
135. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), available
at http://www.icj.cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus-ijudgment/inus-ijudgment 19860627.pdf.
136. Id. at 64-65 115.
137. Prosecutor v.Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Judgment, 109 n.131 (App. Chamber July 15,
1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf [hereinafter
Tadic IV] (citing Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 45-48 11 75-80). This decision followed Tadic III
(the trial chamber's judgment on Tadic's case, handed down on May 7, 1997).
138. Tadic IV, supra note 137, 116.
139. Id. 1 124-31.
140. Id. T 145.
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issue in the case), apply to conflicts that would previously have been
considered civil wars and thus subject to fewer international legal
restrictions. In a later decision, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged
that the Tadic test is "not as rigorous" as the test the Trial Chamber
used, which the Appeals Chamber reviewed and reversed.14 1 The
court declared that "this different and less rigorous standard is wholly
consistent with the fundamental purpose of Geneva Convention IV,
which is to ensure 'protection of civilians to the maximum extent
142
possible."'
The use of "purpose" here refers not to the intention of the
Security Council but instead to that of the authors of the Geneva
Conventions.
The records of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference,
however, reveal that most states did not, in fact, seek to protect
civilians "to the maximum extent possible." While the fourth Geneva
Convention provides some protection to civilians, those guarantees are
relatively weak. 143 Geneva Convention IV, like the other 1949
Conventions, balances the needs of individual and state security. In
its reinterpretation of the provision forty years later, the ICTY put its
own thumb on the scale, coming down heavily in favor of the rights of
individuals in wartime and thus limiting states' authority to act in
ways that may harm civilians.
The early Tadic decisions represent the high-water mark of
judicial expansiveness at the ICTY with regard to the laws of war.
The Tribunal's later decisions have been much more modest. The
phenomenon of initial activism in the laws of war at the ICTY followed
by increasing restraint has not been generally observed or discussed,
so there is no commonly accepted explanation for the trend. One
suspects that it may result from the changing nature of the ICTY
bench. The judges on the Appeals Chamber in Tadic, who were
largely judges on international courts, international diplomats, or
professors of international law, may have been more comfortable with
broadly interpreting international legal principles than the newer
judges at the ICTY, whose professional backgrounds tend to include
more experience in criminal law and domestic adjudication. Perhaps,
too, the Tadic judges were concerned that, if they read the ICTY

141. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment,
145 (App. Chamber Mar.
24, 2000), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal]judgement/ale-asjOOO324e.pdf.
142. Id. 1 146.
143. George H. Aldrich, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL COURTS 99, 100-101 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds.,

2000).
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Statute too narrowly in this early case, the court would terminate
without having convicted any defendants of war crimes.
Whatever the reason for the ICTY's initial burst of judicial
activism, one finds a much different picture at the Rwandan Tribunal.
Because the ICTR Statute explicitly references common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II, one would expect its decisions to have been the
most important component of the Tribunals' exegesis of the laws
governing civil wars. In fact, however, the ICTR's judges have
routinely acquitted its defendants of war crimes, although the
defendants have been convicted of genocide and crimes against
humanity. As of this writing, only three defendants have been
convicted of war crimes by the ICTR. 144 The ICTR's cases have
focused much more on the crime of genocide, which is generally
considered the "crime of crimes" of international criminal law. While
the ICTR Statute provided an important indication that the
permanent members of the Security Council would accept the
extension of the laws of war to civil wars, it was the judges of the
ICTY, not the ICTR, who fully elaborated upon this suggestion.
E. The Codification of the Laws of War in the InternationalCriminal
Court Treaty
Calls to establish an international criminal court date from the
end of World War I. Since that time, however, the idea of an
international criminal court was largely viewed as a quixotic quest
pursued only by the hardiest of international idealists. The drive to
establish an international criminal court paralleled, but did not form
part of, the development of the laws of war. Indeed, as we have seen,
the drafters of the laws of war consistently rejected proposals to
provide for their enforcement in an international court.
Although the laws of war and international criminal law were
briefly united in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, they quickly
diverged after the conclusion of those proceedings. At the same time
that preparations for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference on the Geneva
Conventions were underway, the United Nations General Assembly
instructed its Committee on Codification of International Law to
144. See Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement, (App. Chamber May
20,
2005),
available at http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/cases/Semanza/judgement/appeals
judgement/index.pdf (affirming Trial Chamber convictions); Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement (App. Chamber May 26, 2003), available at http://65.18.216.88/
ENGLISH/cases/Rutagandaldecisions/030526%2OIndex.htm
(affirming
Trial
Chamber
convictions); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T,
Judgement and Sentence,
806 (Trial Chamber III Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://65.
18.216.88/ENGLISH/cases/Imanishimwe/judgement/judgment-en.pdf (convictinglmanishimwe).
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prepare a draft code of international criminal law.145 A separate subcommittee of the Committee on Codification pursued a draft code for
an international criminal court. In the heat of the Cold War, neither
the United States nor the Soviet Union welcomed these developments,
146
and for decades they came to nothing.
In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago introduced a suggestion in the
General Assembly for the establishment of a specialized international
court to combat drug trafficking. The General Assembly requested
that the International Law Commission (the successor of the
Committee on Codification of International Law) complete the draft
statute.' 47 This draft became the basis for the negotiating text for the
treaty of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") that would be
approved by 120 nations in Rome in 1998 and subsequently known as
the Rome Statute.
The ICC has jurisdiction over cases alleging the commission of
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide after July 1, 2002.
The negotiation of the war crimes provision in the statute reflects the
continuing influence of the Great Powers, particularly the permanent
members of the Security Council.
The adoption of the Court's
jurisdictional scheme, however, diverged sharply from the history of
the development of the laws of war in the preceding fifty years
because it represented a significant defeat of the U.S. position.
1. Negotiation of the Rome Statute
The unlikely success of the ICC negotiations was partly due to
the end of the Cold War and the ensuing burst of international
cooperation. The ICTY and ICTR also contributed to the birth of the
ICC in important ways.
The Tribunals demonstrated that
international criminal punishment can be successfully, if awkwardly,
accomplished.
Furthermore,
the Tribunals'
statutes
and
jurisprudence provided a key model for the negotiations of the ICC
treaty.
a. War Crimes in the Rome Statute
Nowhere is the influence of the Tribunals' jurisprudence more
evident than in the Rome Statute's hotly-debated provision on war

145. This took place in 1947. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 597, 608-09 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
146. Id. at 610.
147. Id. at 613-14.
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crimes. 148
Delegates at the Rome Conference demonstrated
familiarity with the Tribunals' cases, bringing copies of key decisions
with their materials for the negotiations. As a technical matter, the
negotiators of the ICC treaty were not bound by the law developed by
the Tribunals. Stare decisis does not formally operate in international
law. Furthermore, international law provides that states are free to
negotiate the terms of any treaty, as long as the provisions do not
violate a jus cogens norm.
Despite the negotiators' authority to disregard the Tribunals'
jurisprudence, much of the Rome Statute follows the lines laid out by
the ICTY in Tadic. The negotiators followed the Tadic court's decision
that the rules governing international and non-international conflicts
are distinct. 149 Like the Tadic Appeals Chamber's decision on Article
2 of the ICTY Statute, the Rome Statute also provides that grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions can only be committed during
international armed conflicts. 15°
Just as it had been in the negotiation of the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols, the applicability of the laws
of war to civil wars was "a major source of contention" during the ICC
negotiations. 51 The United States, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom, among others, supported the inclusion of civil wars in the
Statute. China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and Turkey all
opposed the application of war crimes to civil wars.1 52 The controversy
over the civil war provisions replicated the debate in the earlier
Diplomatic Conferences over how to distinguish international conflicts
from civil wars. The delegates found their solution in the Tribunals'
jurisprudence, particularly the Tadic decision.
For its provision on war crimes, the Rome Statute adopts the
definition of "armed conflict" articulated by the Appeals Chamber in

148. See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdictionof the Court,
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79, 122 (Roy S.

Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT] ("[The content of the core
crimes contained in the [Rome] Statute ... takes into account recent developments, such as those
taking place within the work of the ad hoc Tribunals.").
149. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (distinguishing between "international armed conflict" in
paragraph 2(b) and "armed conflict not of an international character" in paragraphs 2(c)-(f)).
150. KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 18 (2002).
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151. von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 148, at 104 & n.87.
152. Id. at 105; Andreas Zimmermann, Preliminary Remarks on Paragraph 2(c)-(f) and
Paragraph3, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
262, 269 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
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Tadic.153
This definition is broader than the one that was
154
painstakingly crafted in the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference.
With the adoption of this definition and the decision to cover acts
committed in civil war, the transformation of the laws of war that
began with the Security Council's adoption of the provisions on civil
war in the ICTR Statute and that was more fully developed in the
ICTY jurisprudence is now codified in a permanent international
criminal institution.
The final language of the Rome Statute also reflects concerns
that the extension of the laws of war to civil wars would hamper their
ability to maintain order at home. The final text of the treaty provides
that the provisions on war crimes in civil war "shall [not] affect the
responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law and
order in the State."'155 The concern over the ability of states to
suppress rebellions that has shadowed the application of the laws of
war to civil wars since 1949, therefore, is also manifest in the Rome
Statute. The list of war crimes that can be committed in civil wars is
also more abbreviated than its international war cognate. The treaty
does not, for example, prohibit the use of particular weapons in civil
156
war, as it does for international conflicts.
In fact, the text of the ICC treaty betrays ambivalence about
the possibility of war crimes prosecution in a permanent international
body. In some ways, the Rome Statute is quite conservative with
regard to war crimes, particularly those related to prohibited weapons
and the definition of proportionality. During the negotiation of the
treaty, there was significant debate over how to address weapons of
mass destruction. The nuclear states wanted to include a provision
making the use of chemical and biological weapons a crime. The nonnuclear states objected, stating that nuclear weapons should be

153. Rome Statute, supra note 149, art. 8(2)(e)-(f) (enumerating "[o]ther serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the
established framework of international law" and specifying that this list "applies to armed
conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups"). The
Tadic definition states that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State." Tadic II, supra note 114, 70.
154. See Zimmermann, supra note 152, at 285 (stating that the Statute's definition of armed
conflict "is significantly lower than the one contained in article 1 para. 1 of the Second Add. Prot.
which requires sustained and concerted military operations").
155. Rome Statute, supra note 149, art. 8(3).
156. Zimmermann, supra note 152, at 263.
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proscribed as well. The result of this debate was the elimination of
15 7
both provisions, to the dismay of NGO activists.
The history of the negotiation of the Rome Statute reveals that,
like the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and the text of the
Geneva Conventions, the war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute
largely codify positions advocated by the permanent members of the
Security Council-particularly the United States. With regard to the
enforcement scheme, however, the United States was much less
successful.
b.

The ICC Enforcement Regime

One of the reasons that the members of the Security Council
took a relatively insouciant approach to the specifics of the ICTY's and
ICTR's statutes in 1993 was doubtless due to the fact that none of the
states expected its nationals to face prosecution in these courts.
Chinese support for the ICTY, for example, was reportedly gained by
158
an assurance that the Tribunal "had nothing to do with Tibet."
Although NATO members eventually came within the jurisdiction of
the ICTY because of the bombing of Kosovo in 1999, this possibility
was not on the minds of the representatives in 1993.
From the outset, states approached the ICC with more caution.
The Court's jurisdictional scope was the single most controversial
issue in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, the "question of
questions of the entire project." 15 9 The initial draft produced by the
International Law Commission was solicitous of state sovereignty
concerns and set up an enforcement scheme that has been described
as "jurisdiction A la carte." 160 Like the jurisdictional scheme of the
International Court of Justice, it essentially required state consent for
prosecutions on a case-by-case basis, even for states that had ratified
the treaty. 161
It also provided that the Court would not have
jurisdiction over crimes arising out of any situation being considered
by the Security Council under its Chapter VII authority. These two

157. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 148, at 116; Amber McNair, The ICC: A Victory
Despite US Resistance, PEACE MAG., July-Sept. 2002, available at http://www.peace
magazine.org/archive/v18n3p17.htm (arguing that the ICC Statute is "watered down" due in
part to "the exclusion of the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons from being
considered criminal").
158. HAZAN, supra note 67, at 37.
159. Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditionsto the Exercise of Jurisdiction,in 1 THE ROME STATUTE,

supra note 89, at 583, 584.
160. Sharon A. Williams, Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 152, at 329, 337.
161. Id.
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issues-the relationship of the Court to the Security Council and the
prerequisites for all cases not referred by the Security Council-were
the central jurisdictional questions in the negotiation of the ICC
treaty.
The debate over the Court's jurisdiction divided the delegates
into three groups. Unsurprisingly, the P-5 supported a strong role for
the Security Council. These countries advocated that the Security
Council be able to refer cases to the Court and block the Court's
investigation or prosecution of cases under its consideration.
Essentially, the Security Council members, particularly the United
States, wanted the ICC to function as a "type of permanent ad hoc
criminal tribunal."162 They were largely hostile to the possibility of
the referral of cases to the Court by other avenues, especially by an
independent prosecutor.163
The so-called "Like-Minded Group" ("LMG") was an influential
group of states composed of approximately sixty members. Led by
Canada, it also included most members of the European Union (but
not France), Australia, Brazil, and South Africa. The LMG shared a
"commitment to an independent and effective court." 164 Itgenerally
accepted a role for the Security Council in referring cases to the Court
but argued that the Court should have jurisdiction over other cases on
the basis of universal jurisdiction. 16 5 Universal jurisdiction was the
same far-reaching jurisdictional scheme used in the grave-breach
regime-it meant that the Court would have jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes committed
anywhere in the world by any individual as long as a state party to
the ICC treaty has custody over the accused. The LMG also did not
want the Security Council to be able to block the referral of cases to
the Court. The remaining states took various positions between those
of the P-5 and the LMG.
The United States' objective with regard to the jurisdictional
scheme was simple and inflexible: No U.S. national should be
vulnerable to prosecution by the ICC. When it became clear that most
states wanted the Court to have jurisdiction over cases even if some
members of the Security Council objected, the permanent members of
the Council put forth a proposal that would have allowed states to opt
out of the Court's jurisdiction over their nationals for crimes against
humanity and war crimes (but not genocide) for a renewable ten-year
162. Id. at 336.
163. Kaul, supra note 159, at 585.
164. Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference, in 1
THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 89, at 67, 70.

165. Id. at 71.
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period. The proposal would also have prevented the Court from
exercising jurisdiction over cases involving nationals of non-state
parties if the state publicly declared that the individual was acting
according to official state policy. 166 The proposal did not garner
significant support.
The Like-Minded Group eventually backed down on the
question of universal jurisdiction, putting forth a series of more
modest proposals. Among the P-5 members, both Britain and France
indicated that they were amenable to compromise on the question of
jurisdiction. Notably, Britain was the first of the Security Council's
permanent members to demonstrate flexibility on the degree of control
the Security Council would have over the Court's jurisdiction. Its
decision to join the LMG was a key moment for the shape of the ICC
treaty.167 The final solution on the relationship between the Court
and the Security Council was based on a British text.1 68 This text
provides that the Council may defer the investigation or prosecution
by the prosecutor of any case for twelve months by a resolution under
its Chapter VII powers. 16 9 The treaty also allows the Court to exercise
jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the Security Council, by a state
party, or by the independent prosecutor. In the latter two categories,
the ICC will not have jurisdiction over the case unless either the state
where the crime occurred or the state whose national is accused of
170
committing the crime has ratified the Rome Statute.
France agreed to this jurisdictional scheme on the condition
that the treaty include an opt-out for war crimes. 17 1 Accordingly, the
final text allows states to opt out of the jurisdiction over war crimes
for seven years, but it does not allow this possibility with regard to
any of the other crimes in the treaty. 172 The jurisdictional scheme
differs significantly from that of the ad hoc tribunals in one final
respect. Domestic prosecutions take priority. Should a state choose to
prosecute or investigate a case itself, either action will divest the ICC
of jurisdiction.
Substantive decisions at the Rome Conference, following
general U.N. practice for treaty negotiations, were made by
166. Kaul, supra note 159, at 603.
167. Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 164, at 70.
168. Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Peji6, Article 16: Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 152, at 373, 376.
169. Rome Statute, supra note 149, art. 16. The Council can renew the request for deferral
upon the expiration of the twelve-month period. Id.
170. Id. art. 12(2). A state may also accept the jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc basis
with regard to that particular situation. Id. art. 12(3).
171. Williams, supra note 160, at 338.
172. Rome Statute, supra note 149, art. 124.
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consensus. 173 If a decision could not be reached by consensus,
contested matters were settled by a three-fifths majority vote.
Although the consensus procedure normally provides states in the
minority with significant bargaining leverage, the activity of NGOs at
the conference changed the dynamics of the negotiations. Two weeks
before the end of the Rome Conference, the Canadian Chairman of the
Conference issued a draft that narrowed the proposals on jurisdiction
and set out various potential solutions. A prominent NGO at the
Conference, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC),
compiled the positions of individual states on each proposal, providing
a "virtual vote" on the document. This tally disclosed that the United
States' positions were distinctly in the minority. 174 The information
revealed by the CICC "bypassed the diplomatic niceties of the
consensus procedure," significantly weakening the United States'
bargaining position. 175
During the last week of the Rome Conference, Russia hosted a
private dinner limited to senior delegates from the P-5.176 The
objective of the dinner was to pressure Britain into rejecting the
LMG's jurisdictional proposal. NGOs learned of the meeting and
engaged in a flurry of lobbying activity in London, arguing that Blair's
"ethical foreign policy" demanded a robust ICC. One observer wrote
that "[flaced with such a massive upwelling of vigilance, the Brits in
1 77
Rome appeared to stiffen their position once again."
The treaty's final text was presented to the delegates in the
waning hours of the conference as a package deal not subject to
renegotiation.
The United States again proposed the P-5's
jurisdictional compromise. Only Qatar and China spoke in favor of
the amendment, which was resoundingly defeated. 78 The treaty was
1 79
adopted by a vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, and 21 abstentions.
Among those voting against the statute were the United States,
18 0
China, and Israel.

173. Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC: Past, Present, and Future, in The UNITED
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 61, 64 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
174. Id. at 64.
175. Id.

176. Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the Struggle for
an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 173, at 85,

105.
177. Id.

178. Williams, supra note 160, at 338 & n.67.
179. Roy S. Lee, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 148, at 1,
26.

180. Id. at 26 n.48
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With the establishment of the ICC, the enforcement scheme of
the Geneva Conventions was transformed. Although the grave-breach
system survives, and neither the Tribunals' jurisprudence nor the
Rome Statute has formally amended the Geneva Conventions, the ICC
has become a focal point for the prosecution of violations of the laws of
war. The enforcement regime specifically rejected by the delegates in
the earlier Diplomatic Conferences has been formally adopted in the
guise of the ICC treaty. Furthermore, this newest incarnation of the
laws of war is the first step in the development of the Geneva
Conventions where the United States strongly opposes the
enforcement scheme.
IV: INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING: POLITICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES

The most recent transformation of the laws of war has
proceeded in three distinct stages: (1) the Security Council's decision
to establish the ICTY and ICTR, (2) the subsequent reorientation of
the Geneva Conventions undertaken by the ICTY judiciary, and (3)
the codification of those developments by states in the negotiations of
the ICC treaty. Viewing this process over time, the ICTY judiciary's
lawmaking emerges as the key transitional stage. It brought the
Geneva Conventions to life through the adjudication of actual cases; it
changed the definition of armed conflict in a way that lowered the
threshold for applying laws that govern international conflicts; and it
enhanced the regime governing civil wars. By so doing, it paved the
way for the codification of these solutions in the ICC.
Nevertheless, the ICTY's lawmaking is problematic from both a
legal and political perspective. Given the growing importance of
international judicial decisionmaking more generally, understanding
and evaluating its role in international criminal law has implications
far beyond the question of whether war crimes can be committed in
civil wars.
Under traditional positivist understandings of
international law, only states-and not courts-make law. When the
Security Council established the Tribunals, Council members, as well
as the secretary-general, specifically stated that the Tribunals could
not and should not make new law. The legitimacy of the Tribunals'
lawmaking appears tenuous, at best.
Upon reflection, however, what appears problematic is, in fact,
both politically reasonable and legally justifiable. For scholars of
international politics, the dominant conceptual approach to
international courts is to view their authority as stemming from a
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delegation of domestic sovereign authority.18 1 This perspective is often
articulated in a theory of rational design, which takes as its initial
premise that "states use international institutions to further their own
goals, and they design institutions accordingly." 18 2 One common
description of international courts rooted in a rational choice
conception (synonymous, in this context, to rational design) is that
states, as principals, delegate to courts, as agents, tasks that states
themselves cannot do efficiently.1 8 3 A principal-agent understanding
of international courts, therefore, suggests that courts should act in
accordance with the principals' wishes, in this case, the states that
established the court. 8 4 Failure of an agent to do so is often described
pejoratively as agency slack or slippage. 8 5 Although agency slack is
perceived as a potential problem with domestic courts as well, the
sovereignty costs inherent in the delegation to an international
institution-and particularly to a court-are usually described as
86
more acute.1
If one views the Tribunals as agents of the principal-in this
case, the Security Council-then the Tribunals' lawmaking appears to
be a paradigmatic example of agency slack. Members of the Security
Council clearly stated that the Tribunals could not make law. The
amicus brief filed by the United States in Tadic declares that "[i]n
creating the Tribunal, the Council was acting to deal with a specific
urgent situation presenting a serious threat to the peace. It was not
creating new standards for international humanitarian law."'18 7
A theory of rational design, however, posits that, when
principals delegate to agents, they also structure the institution in
order to retain control over the agents to discipline them if they run

181. Alter, supra note 3, at 58-59.
182. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of
InternationalInstitutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
183. See, e.g., MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION,

AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU 21 (2003); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to
Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (2005).
184. See Kathleen R. McNamara, Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the
Social Logic of Delegation,25 W. EUR. POL., Jan. 2002, at 47, 50 (describing the expectation "that
the agent's subsequent actions will be aligned with the principal's preferences"); Paul B.
Stephan, Courts, Tribunals,and Legal Unification-TheAgency Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333,
336 (2002) (describing how states can try to ensure that adjudicatory bodies do, in fact, act in
accordance with the state's wishes).
185. See, e.g., POLLACK, supra note 183, at 26; McNamara, supra note 184, at 55.
186. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: DemocraticDelegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 227 (2000) ("The 'sovereignty cost' of delegating to an
international judge is likely to be even greater than that of delegating to a domestic judge.").
187. U.S. Amicus Brief in Tadic I, supra note 115, at 14.

2006]

WHEN COURTS MAKE LAW

off the rails.18 8 Indeed, the Security Council controls the Tribunals'
budgets, has the authority to amend their statutes, and is actively
involved in the selection of the Tribunals' judges. If the lawmaking
undertaken by the Tribunals ran contrary to the wishes of the
Security Council we would, in theory, expect to see the members of the
Council taking steps to rein in their wayward creation.
The
relationship of the Security Council to the Tribunals, however, does
not demonstrate this pattern. The Council has steadily increased the
Tribunals' budgets since their inception.18 9 There are no examples of
states publicly attacking the Tribunals' war crimes jurisprudence.
More subtle measures also indicate state acceptance of the
jurisprudence. In private conversations, ICTY judges state that they
have not received political pressure after making controversial
decisions. While there are several notable examples of individual
states publicly attacking the work of the Tribunals' prosecutor1 90
(including, in the case of the ICTR, getting the prosecutor fired),1 91 one
cannot find similar examples with regard to the Tribunals'
jurisprudence on the laws of war. Because states went to great
trouble to negotiate the precise wording of the Geneva Conventions,
this muted response is especially puzzling.
This silence is susceptible to two, seemingly contradictory,
explanations. 192 The ICTY judiciary may be an example of an agent
that has contravened the instructions of the principal but has
somehow escaped discipline. Or, the ICTY judges may have acted as a
sophisticated agent that understood what the principals desired, even
in the face of seemingly contradictory political rhetoric. The former
description adds credence to those who describe the ICTY's lawmaking
as illegitimate; the latter suggests that the activity is legitimate, even
188. Stephan, supra note 184, at 336.
189. While the Security Council announced in 2003 that it would cease funding the
Tribunals after 2010, this decision is widely understood as an expression of impatience with the
slow work of the Tribunals, rather than as unhappiness with any specific aspect of their
jurisprudence. See S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, U.N.
Doc. SfRES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); Mirko Klarin, Is the Tribunal Running Out of Time?, INST. FOR
WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, March 4-9, 2002, available at http://www.iwpr.net/
index.pl?archive/triltri257 _eng.txt. The original timetable was proposed by the ICTY itself.
Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the "Completion Strategies"on the Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals,99 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142 n.5 (2005).

190. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretion at the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 538-40 (2003).

191. Hirondelle News Agency, ICTRlProsecution-Synthesis: Prosecutors at the ICTR,
http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
192. This is the problem of observational equivalence. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
BureaucraticDiscretion or Congressional Control?Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 766 (1983) (describing two potential understandings of
regulatory policymaking based on two opposing assumptions).
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Each of these

A. The ICTYas Rogue Agent?
One possibility is that states did not anticipate that the
Tribunals would engage in lawmaking, and they would not have
accepted such a role for the Tribunals had it been proposed. The best
evidence for this understanding is the clear statements by members of
the Security Council that the Tribunals could not undertake this
activity.
Furthermore, U.S. officials stated that the conflict in
Yugoslavia was an international one and, therefore, would have been
unlikely to anticipate that the ICTY would rewrite the rules on civil
wars. 193 All this suggests that the ICTY's judicial rewriting of the
laws of war was outside the bounds of its delegated function.
That states have not protested the ICTY's conclusions in Tadic
does not necessarily demonstrate that such lawmaking was either
anticipated or desired in 1993 when the Tribunal was established.
State acceptance of this unasked-for lawmaking may be due to the fact
that the Tribunals have not thus far adjudicated the issues of most
concern to powerful states.
Very few cases, for example, have
addressed the question of Hague Law, that is, the law regulating
tactical decisions made on the battlefield. The one decision that
addresses Hague law thus far is carefully reasoned and quite
detailed.194
Furthermore, most of the conduct judged thus far,
including the extrajudicial execution of prisoners, has long been
proscribed by the laws of war.
In addition, the full import of some of the judicial decisions
may not yet be apparent. Other scholars who have examined why
states do not respond to far-reaching decisions by international courts
that contradict states' interests argue that politicians and diplomats
focus on short-term objectives and generally ignore the potential longterm effects of courts' rulings. 195 In consequence, states do not
attempt to rewrite the rules, or force the court to do so, until it is too
late. The Tribunals' jurisprudence on "internationalized" armed
conflicts may fall in this category. U.S. officials may simply not
realize that the ICTY's decisions suggest that any intervention in a
193. U.S. Amicus Brief in Tadic I, supra note 115, at 7 ("[We believe that the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia has been, and continues to be, of an international character.").
194. Prosecutor v. Galik, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion (Dec. 5, 2003),
availableat http://www.un.org/icty/galic/trialc/judgement/gal-tj031205e.pdf.
195. Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and the
EuropeanCourt of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121, 130-31 (1998).
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civil war that can be characterized as "overall control" over one of the
parties to the conflict means that the conflict is an international one,
subjecting all of its participants to the elaborate rules governing
international wars.
It is clear, however, that some states are aware of the major
outlines of the ICTY caselaw. States have incorporated the Tribunal's
jurisprudence into their military manuals and training on the laws of
war.
This incorporation constitutes one of the most important
indications of official state policy with regard to the laws of war. The
Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict recently issued by the United
Kingdom, for example, includes references to the caselaw of the
Tribunals. In particular, the Manual quotes decisions from the ICTY
on the definition of the term "armed conflict."'196 Decisions from the
Tribunals are also included in law-of-war training for members of the
197
U.S. Judge Advocate Generals' Corps.
The decisions reached by the ICTY in Tadic largely reflect the
positions taken by powerful countries-particularly the United
States-in the negotiations of the 1949 and 1974-77 Geneva
Conventions. The political losers from the ICTY's revision of the laws
of war appear to be developing countries. Their hostility to extending
the rules to civil wars is manifest in the records from the 1949 and
1974-77 Diplomatic Conferences. The silence of these states in the
face of the judicial decisions that have systematically undercut the
bargains they secured in the earlier negotiations may be due to the
fact that these countries lack the resources to monitor the work of the
Tribunals. Even if aware of the decisions, these states may not wish
to pick a fight with an institution established by the powerful Security
Council.
Nevertheless, one should approach this conclusion with
caution. Developing countries' perceptions about the importance of
domestic application of the laws of war-and particularly criminal
accountability for violation of these rules-may have changed in the
thirty-odd years since the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference. Since that
time, many states have shifted to more democratic forms of
governance, and there is increasing acceptance of the idea of criminal
accountability for mass atrocity under international law. 98 That
democratic developing countries would now push for the rules they
196. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004).
197. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER &
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 82, 144, 209-12 (2004) (citing Tadic II, supra note
114).

198. Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies,Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in InternationalLaw, 87
GEO. L.J. 707, 707-08 (1999).
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secured in 1977 is not at all clear, but the opposition of China, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and Turkey to the inclusion in the ICC
treaty of crimes committed in civil wars suggests that many states
retain similar concerns today.
The case that the ICTY has acted as a rogue agent, then, rests
on the fact that members of the Security Council underscored that the
Tribunals could only apply "existing international humanitarian law"
but that the ICTY altered several foundational jurisdictional premises
of the laws of war. The "rogue agent" scenario would hypothesize that
states did not subsequently discipline the ICTY because the states
with the capacity to discipline the Tribunals have chosen not to take
this step, due either to a lack of interest or knowledge. The countries
that disfavor the rules are either unaware of them or lack the capacity
or political firepower to attack the Tribunals.
B. The ICTYas FaithfulAgent?
On the other hand, one can argue that the Tribunals'
lawmaking function was understood and accepted by the members of
the Security Council, even as they publicly denied its possibility. The
Security Council had reason in 1993 to soft-peddle the ICTY's
significance. In particular, the Council faced criticism by states not on
the Council that a Chapter VII resolution was an insufficiently
democratic way to establish an international court and that it should
instead be established by treaty. Calling attention to the fact that the
ICTY would also likely make far-reaching decisions related to the
Geneva Conventions, crimes against humanity, and genocide would
simply have fanned the flames of resentment against the Council's
power. 199
As Canada's submission to the secretary-general made clear, in
1993 there was little existing jurisprudence upon which the ICTY
could rely. None of the crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction had
been prosecuted in an international forum since the post-World War II
Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings. They had been rarely, if ever,
pursued in a domestic forum. Crimes against humanity had never
been incorporated into a treaty and the scope of the violations
included within the vaguely worded Article 3 was uncertain. As
enacted by the Security Council, the ICTY Statute resembled the bold
outlines of a coloring book: much remained for the judges to fill in.

199. See Ralph Zacklin, Some Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 361, 363-64 (2004) (describing how any use by the Tribunal of Chapter VII to
legislate for member states would have been highly controversial).
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More generally, international judicial lawmaking may be the
truth of international politics that cannot be named. Because of
concerns about accountability, states simply do not want to
acknowledge that international courts make international law-even
as the vague treaties they provide to these courts effectively act as a
delegation of lawmaking authority. International judges, in turn,
understand and reinforce the political slight-of-hand by denying that
they make law.
International judicial lawmaking is often subtle. International
judicial decisions frequently rely on the assertion that they are simply
"declaring" customary international law. 200 Indeed, the judges in
Tadic described their conclusions on the laws of war as statements of
pre-existing customary international law, 201 despite little, if any, state
practice to support their conclusions. Academic commentators
similarly obscure the lawmaking activities of international judges by
describing the courts' actions as articulation of custom, making the
judges' role seem more passive than it is.
Although judicial
identification of international custom may often reflect actual state
practice, some of the Tribunals' law-of-war decisions demonstrate that
20 2
this is not always the case.
The hypothesis of tacit delegated lawmaking finds support in
the range of international courts that have engaged in this activity.
The European Court of Justice, for example, has effectively
transformed the relationship between the European Union and its
member states. 20 3 The Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization has issued decisions that engage non-trade related
subjects, such as health and the environment, in ways barely hinted at
in the texts of the underlying treaties. 20 4 The International Court of
Justice has reshaped the law on transboundary resources, including
rivers and fish stocks. 205 The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has clarified

200. Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting
Efficiency, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 85, 85-87

(Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds. 2004).
201. Tadic II, supra note 114, at
125, 127, 130, 134.
202. Jos6 Alvarez argues that the denial of lawmaking by the ICTY and ICTR judges derives
in part from the Tribunals' need to convince observers of the legitimacy of their role as "the
international community's enforcer of social norms." JOSP, E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 532 (2005).

203. See Alter, supra note 195, at 126; Burley & Mattli, supra note 4, at 41-42; J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2407 (1991).
204. See BROUDE, supra note 4, at 26-27; Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the
WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,and Political Constraints,98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 251-52 (2004);

Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 365 (1999).
205. Benvenisti, supra note 200, at 95-97.
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and shaped the international law of unlawful expropriation. 20 6 Most
of these decisions have been subsequently accepted as valid by states,
20 7
despite their often weak textual or customary law bases.
That international courts engage in lawmaking is unsurprising
to those who study principal-agent relationships. Principals often
delegate the task of completing contracts (or lawmaking, in the
context of a court) to agents. 208 In fact, the ICTY-as-rogue-agent and
ICTY-as-faithful-agent stories are not incompatible. The members of
the Security Council were surely aware that the Tribunal would have
to fill in the details of the vague ICTY Statute. The ICTY Statute
itself specifically instructs the judges, for example, to write the rules
of procedure and evidence. It is also probable that the states on the
Council would not have anticipated that the ICTY would significantly
rewrite the rules on civil wars, although they did expect (or should
have expected) the ICTR to do so.
This is not to say that the states on the Security Council
envisioned that lawmaking was the Tribunals' principal task. After
all, if states wanted institutions solely to make law, they could
conceivably create an administrative agency to engage in this
activity.209 The primary goals of the Tribunals were quite differentprincipally punishing those guilty of mass atrocities in the relevant
regions and fostering peace-and their success in these aims was far
from assured. 210 But the states on the Council were most likely aware
that these new international courts would engage in lawmaking, even
if they did not specifically create them for this purpose. States' public
refusal to recognize this possibility also provided them with the ability
to denounce the Tribunals later on, should the courts reach a decision
with which states disagreed.
When the ICTY did undertake its revision of the laws of war, it
both furthered the Council's immediate purpose of punishing those
involved in the atrocities in Yugoslavia and largely accorded with the
views expressed by the most powerful states on the Council during the
negotiations of the original treaties. The ICTY, therefore, can also be
seen as a quite sophisticated agent-one that understood the tacit
206. Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 32, on file with author).
207. Benvenisti, supra note 200, at 98.
208. POLLACK, supra note 183, at 21.
209. I am indebted to Eric Posner for this point.
210. Richard Holbrooke has acknowledged that, in 1993, among members of the Clinton
administration, the Tribunal was widely seen as a "public relations device." PAUL R. WILLIAMS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 100 (2002). One observer of the Tribunals commented in 1994 that states did not
regard the ICTY as a serious venture. Forsythe, supra note 77, at 403.
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message of the Security Council and stayed within the boundaries
desired by the principal's key members.
There is one final possibility in the faithful agent scenario.
States on the Council stated that the Tribunals would not engage in
lawmaking, and the Tribunals did not, in fact, engage in lawmaking
because international courts cannot make law-at least if law is
defined as formally binding precedent or commands. It is true that
the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR do not technically bind other
courts. As a matter of formal international law, states remain free to
reject the decisions reached by the Tribunals on questions related to
the meaning of the Geneva Conventions.
The legal decisions rendered by the Tribunals, however, are
widely viewed as an authoritative source for interpretations of
international humanitarian law. The Tribunals' caselaw has been
cited as persuasive authority by other international criminal courts,
by domestic courts, by international organizations, by NGOs, and by
scholars. These sources treat the Tribunals' jurisprudence as lawnot merely proposals for what international law should be. While a
full explanation of the acceptance of the decisions by international
courts as law is beyond the scope of this Article, some have suggested
it is because international courts are viewed as having a special claim
to legitimacy as a source for rule articulation. 211 Others contend that
international judicial decisions serve as "focal points," which are
influential simply because of the identification of the position as "the
law." 212 Whatever the reason, it is clear that the legal decisions issued
by the ICTY are considered more authoritative than statements from
other actors, such as NGOs or international legal scholars. They are
treated as relevant articulations of the law, even if their precedents do
not formally bind other courts.
C. A Legal Justificationfor InternationalJudicialLawmaking
Even assuming that the Security Council anticipated that the
Tribunals would engage in lawmaking, such a delegation is not
necessarily normatively desirable.
It could be argued that
international judges are unsuited for international lawmaking
because they are relatively unaccountable, subject to opaque selection

211. Alter, supra note 3, at 53. For a discussion of the factors that might influence a court's
legitimacy, see Alvarez, supra note 202, at 546-66.
212. Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating In Anarchy: An Expressive Theory
of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1269 (2004).
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procedures, and may not have expertise in the relevant subject
2 13
matter.
Despite these potential drawbacks, the experience of the
Tribunals demonstrates the important-even unique-role that
international courts can serve in the international system. Most
importantly, international courts can keep international rules
relevant to changing conditions. The ICTY's decisions transformed
the laws of war by recharacterizing the thresholds needed to trigger
the rules on international conflicts and civil wars, by declaring that
there is individual criminal responsibility for acts committed in
internal armed conflict, and by altering the rules on international
conflicts to accommodate internationalized wars rooted in ethnic
conflict. With these decisions, the Tribunals effectively updated the
rules negotiated in 1949 and 1977 to make them more relevant to
contemporary conflicts, the majority of which are civil wars rooted in
ethnic tension. 2 14 In their focus on the protection of individual
victims, the Tribunals' decisions also reflect the strength of the
international human rights movement, which was only in its infancy
when the treaties were negotiated in 1949.
William Eskridge has argued that this dynamic statutory
interpretation, by which he means precisely this kind of judicial
updating, is most appropriate when the relevant texts are old, where a
single legislative purpose is not obvious, and where underlying
conditions have changed. 2 15 These conditions describe the context
surrounding the Tadic decision.
This "evolutive" 216 theory of
interpretation, therefore, provides a normative justification for the
ICTY's jurisprudence. Eskridge's formula suggests that the Tribunals
correctly adopted a dynamic vision when interpreting the primary
rules of the laws of war.
One of the principal failings of the codified laws of war in the
past sixty years has been their inapplicability to internal conflicts,
despite the reality that "many of the actual battles of the Cold War
took place in civil wars. '217 The Tadic decisions, holding that the
ICTY would have jurisdiction over non-international armed conflicts

213. These issues are explored in Karen J. Alter, Resolving or ExacerbatingDisputes? The
WTO's New Dispute Resolution System, 79 INT'L AFF. 783, 793-94 (2003).
214. That is not to say that civil wars are caused by ethnic conflict. See HIRONAKA, supra
note 62, at 5.
215. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1483-84 (1987).
216. Id.
217. ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER AND CHAOS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 13 (2003).
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and finding that there was individual criminal responsibility for
crimes committed in internal armed conflicts under international law,
wrought a "small revolution" in the law of war. 218 Although many had
believed such a development was necessary, it had failed to
materialize in the negotiations over the Additional Protocols in the
1970s. The ICTY pushed the law of war over this sticky spot, and the
delegates to the ICC treaty accepted and codified this development.
The experience of the Tribunals suggests that international
courts can provide significant benefits for states as part of a broader
system of law creation, particularly in interpreting treaties in light of
changed conditions.
Within a broader institutional and legal
framework, international courts have the ability and expertise to take
principles negotiated and developed by states and increase their
precision and applicability to contemporary circumstances. Case-bycase adjudication may also produce rules more attuned to the reality
of the subject than the abstract formulas worked out in diplomatic
219
conferences.
If not responsive to the current state of the world, law becomes
increasingly irrational and arbitrary. 220
The problem of treaty
obsolescence (or at least anachronism) is pervasive in international
law because of the difficulty of renegotiating treaties and the
uncertain contours of customary international law. Indeed, "one of the
greatest challenges in institutional design is to find the optimal tradeoff between stickiness and flexibility." 22 1 Because they are inherently
dynamic, international courts are an important source of flexibility in
international norms.
They can help assure the relevance of
international law.
The utility of international courts as a source of norm
generation, however, depends on their relationship to states. It is
precisely the lack of strong political influence on their work that
allows courts to be more agile sources of law than state-centered fora.
Diplomatic conferences, for example, can derail quite easily under the
pressure of international politics. The difficulties faced in the 1974-77
diplomatic conference on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions demonstrate how a seemingly minor issue-the status of
a handful of countries under colonial rule--can upend the primary
218. Claus Kress, War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the
Emerging System ofInternational CriminalJustice, 30 ISR. Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 103, 105 (2001).

219. See Patricia M. Wald, Punishment of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 69 SOC.
RES. 1119, 1127 (2002) (arguing that case law clarifies ambiguities in statutes and treaties when
applied to specific situations).
220. TIMOTHY A. 0. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAw 193 (2000).

221. Koremenos et al., Looking Back, supranote 5, at 1076.
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purpose of the meeting, which, in that case, was to protect the rights
of individuals in wartime.
The relative apolitical nature of
international courts, however, depends both on states' willingness to
leave courts alone and on international judges' reluctance to act in
222
ways that upset the apple cart.
Dynamic theories of interpretation invest the interpreters with
a significant amount of discretion. 223 Lawmaking by international
judges can go too far. If decisions by international judges push far
beyond what states are willing to tolerate and states begin to reject
the newly-created rules, then an international court's usefulness as a
lawmaking device evaporates. 224 It is particularly ironic to celebrate
the lawmaking undertaken by a criminal court. In a criminal court,
the principle of legality is clearly imperiled by judicial lawmaking,
which can undermine the legitimacy of international criminal
punishment altogether. 225 A recognition of this principle perhaps
explains why the lawmaking of the ICTY and the ICTR has grown
progressively less pronounced over time.
As a general matter, the problem posed by old and uncertain
law may simultaneously justify the utility of international courts,
which can update rules in a dynamic way that states cannot, and
predict the conditions under which states are less likely to attack their
decisions.
This suggests that aggressive international judicial
lawmaking is more appropriate in some cases than others. It is
difficult to justify judicial lawmaking in the newly created WTO, for
226
example, on the grounds of changing or unanticipated conditions.
While this Article has argued that judicial lawmaking in the context of
international criminal law is normatively preferable (since there
existed no other body that realistically would have performed a
similar function), whether that same observation holds for institutions
with a stronger possibility of state-created law is much less certain.
Furthermore,
lawmaking by international
courts-just
like
222. Burley & Mattli, supra note 4, at 44.
223. John C. Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209,
2229-31 (1995).
224. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Heifer, Why States Create
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005)
(describing the ex ante and ex post controls available to states that wish to check a tribunal's
decision-making authority).
225. This issue is explored in Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty
Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
InternationalCriminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 96-102 (2005).
226. See generally BROUDE, supra note 4 (explaining how the WTO membership has
relinquished its decisionmaking responsibility to the judicial body of the WTO and arguing that
the members must now reassume these responsibilities by creating a political decisionmaking
process within the organization).
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lawmaking through international treaties-does not guarantee that
states will, in practice, observe the resulting rules. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the laws of war, where state compliance with
treaty commitments is often tenuous, at best.
V. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW

A. The Importance of Change and the Limits of State Control
One of the most striking features of the story of the sixty-year
interaction between international criminal law and the laws of war is
the significant amount of change in the character of the institutions
and in states' approach to them. Some of the alterations are the
predictable result of major geo-political shifts, such as Britain's and
France's loss of their colonies between 1949 and 1977. Nevertheless,
not all of the key transformations track transitions in the character of
the state itself. Indeed, two of the most important modifications
occurred as a result of domestic shifts between political parties: the
election of President Bush in 2000 and the victory of Britain's Labor
Party in 1997. Each of these marked significant adjustments in the
state's approach to international criminal enforcement.
The backing of the United States was essential to the creation
of the Nuremberg, Tokyo, and Yugoslav Tribunals. The United States
also actively participated in the ICC negotiations. President Clinton
ultimately elected to sign the ICC treaty, although he expressed
reservations about some of its provisions. 227 President Bush, however,
adamantly opposed the ICC and overtly repudiated his predecessor's
signature of the treaty. Britain was initially the most hostile of the
liberal powers toward both Nuremberg and the ICTY. The Labor
government's "ethical foreign policy," however, produced a shift in
Britain's approach to international criminal enforcement. Britain
began to support the ICTY and proved a critical force in derailing the
United States' vision of an ICC subject to significant Security Council
control.
Scholars of international relations and international law are
increasingly aware of the paucity of theoretical tools that have been
developed to describe, model, and predict both institutional change
and alterations in states' preferences. 228 Indeed, the changes in this
227. Associated Press, Clinton's Words: "The Right Action," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6.
228. See, e.g., Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelan, Introduction: Institutional Change in
Advanced Political Economies, Beyond Continuity, in INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED
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story do not track any of the classic models of state behavior in
international relations.
Realist scholars-who view states as
generally hostile to multilateral courts over which they do not exercise
significant control 229-would predict Bush's hostility to the ICC but
not Blair's enthusiasm for the Court.
Liberal scholars-who
emphasize major differences in domestic regime type such as
democracy and autocracy as the primary determinant of state
preferences 23 0-would recognize the critical role of domestic forces but
likely would not account for short-term shifts in political control, such
as the Republican victory over the Democratic presidential candidate
in the United States in 2000.
Recent analysis by historical institutionalist scholars provides
a possible way to understand the changes that occurred. These
scholars would emphasize the key difference between the Clinton and
Bush administrations in terms of how they "framed" the issue of the
ICC. 231 Under both presidents, the United States used military force
and legal mechanisms of accountability for war crimes, yet Clinton
and Bush framed the possibility of U.S. participation in the ICC in
starkly different terms. 232
Clinton, when he signed the treaty,
referred to the country's "long history of commitment to the principle
of accountability, from our involvement in the Nuremberg Tribunals
that brought Nazi war criminals to justice to our leadership in the
effort to establish the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 233 Officials of the Bush administration,
however, downplayed this aspect of the ICC and emphasized its threat

POLITICAL ECONOMIES 1, 1 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelan eds., 2005); Michael Barnett &
Liv Coleman, DesigningPolice: Interpol and the Study of Change In InternationalOrganizations,
49 INT'L STUD. Q. 593, 593 (2005) ("For all the attention international relations scholars have
heaped on international organizations. . ., they have scarcely considered the fundamental issue
of organizational change."); Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International
Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript at 7, on file with author) (noting that what international organizations do "once they
have been created remains surprisingly unexamined and undertheorized.").
229. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2005).

230. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of InternationalLaw, 94 AMER. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 240, 249 (2000).
231. For a general explanation of "framing' in this context, see Peter A. Hall, Preference
Formation as a PoliticalProcess: The Case of Monetary Union in Europe, in PREFERENCES AND
SITUATIONS:

POINTS

OF

INTERSECTION

BETWEEN

HISTORICAL

AND

RATIONAL

CHOICE

INSTITUTIONALISM 129, 133-34 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005) [hereinafter
PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS].

232. Clinton sent troops to Kosovo in 1999, and the Bush administration supported the war
crimes trials of Saddam Hussein.
233. Associated Press, supra note 227, at A6.
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to U.S. military power. 234 Each description of the United States'
stance towards the Court resonates with a different aspect of U.S.
foreign policy. But one would have difficulty predicting ex ante which
preference would predominate at a particular moment.
In 1998, the ICC gave Britain an opportunity to demonstrate
its solidarity with Europe by defecting from the stance of other
members of the Security Council in the negotiations over a prominent
international institution. After 2001, Britain diverged from much of
the rest of Europe in its strong support of the United States' war on
terrorism. Despite its participation in the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq and its vulnerability to possible prosecution of its officials by the
Court, however, Britain has not signaled any lesser commitment to
the ICC post-2001. In this case, one can observe a change that might
have been expected but did not occur.
These changes in states' positions on international criminal
enforcement highlight the weaknesses of theoretical models that
assume that states' preferences remain constant. Some variants of
rational choice scholarship, 235 for example, take this view, 236 although
scholars working in this tradition are increasingly adapting the model
to account for changing preferences. 237
The recent history of
international criminal law highlights how important these
refinements are if scholars seek to describe the reality of how states
interact with international institutions.
This history also supports those scholars who argue that
international institutions themselves can transform the environment
in which states negotiate over the proper role and character of

234. William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Remarks at the
San Francisco World Affairs Council (May 30, 2002), http://www.dod.gov/speeches/
2002/s20020530-Haynes.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
235. Rational choice explains why people, and collections of people, make the choices they do.
In more formal terms, rational choice is a label for a variety of approaches that explain outcomes
in terms of goal-directed behavior under conditions of scarcity. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Rational
Choice and International Relations, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 73, 73-74

(Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). When applied to international law, rational choice generally
describes the relevant actors as individual nation-states, views international agreements as
contracts that resolve problems of coordination or collaboration among states, and understands
these contracts as changing the incentives of states' interactions. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 424 (2000)
[hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law].
236. Alexander Wendt, Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of
InstitutionalDesign, 55 INT'L ORG. 1019, 1022, 1024 (2001).

237. See generally David W. Brady, John A. Ferejohn & Jeremy C. Pope, Congress and Civil
Rights Policy: An Examination of Endogenous Preferences, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS,

supranote 231, at 62.
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international rules and institutions.238 The ultimate shape of the ICC
was critically dependent on the success of its predecessors. One can
trace the trajectory of international criminal law from the Nuremberg
and Tokyo proceedings, to the ad hoc tribunals, to the ICC. While
Trinidad and Tobago's initial appeal in 1989 for an international
criminal court antedates the establishment of the ICTY, the final ICC
treaty resembles the ICTY much more closely than Trinidad and
Tobago's original proposal. The ICC, for example, does not include
transnational crimes like drug trafficking in its jurisdiction (although
this was the impetus for Trinidad and Tobago's suggestion) and
instead only references those crimes also within the Tribunals'
jurisdiction.
From the perspective of the United States, the history of
international criminal justice provides a story of unintended and
seemingly undesirable consequences.
Four of the five major
international criminal courts in this history were heavily dependent
on the United States. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that they would
have existed, or could have functioned, without U.S. support. Yet, it
was their very success-particularly that of the ICTY and ICTR-that
doomed the United States' vision of international criminal justice.
The Tribunals demonstrated that international criminal
punishment was a plausible response to mass atrocity, even as they
highlighted the injustice of selective prosecution of international
criminal law dictated solely by the Security Council. Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, after all, were not the only countries after 1947 to experience
war crimes on a vast scale, but, because of the Security Council's
internal political dynamics, they were the only ones for which
international tribunals were established.
The delegates at Rome embraced the idea of international
criminal prosecution embodied in the Tribunals, but they rejected
their total dependence on the Security Council and ad hoc
jurisdictional schemes. The delegations that made up the LikeMinded Group rallied around the cry of equality before the law. The
emphasis by the United States on the importance of international
criminal justice in the contexts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda made the
United States' resistance to the potential application of international
criminal law to its own nationals difficult to swallow, even for its
traditional allies. Ultimately, the United States-the state most
238. See, e.g., MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 158 (2004); Barnett & Coleman, supra note

228, at 594 (arguing that international organizations are "strategic actors and... that the
strategies they adopt in response to environmental pressures represent one important source of
change in their tasks, design, and mandate").

20061

WHEN COURTS MAKE LAW

responsible for the shape of international criminal law-was unable to
dictate the terms of the regime's most ambitious project.
Scholars have increasingly explored the extent to which states
control international courts.2 39 Although it is hazardous to draw
general conclusions from a single case, the United States' experience
with the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC suggests that, as an
institutional type, international courts may be particularly difficult for
states to control. In important ways, the very legitimacy of a court
derives from its independence from direct state influence. This is
particularly true in the case of international criminal law, where the
courts serve partially to enunciate international community norms
about appropriate behavior in wartime. 240 Nevertheless, as the ICTY's
interpretation of the laws of war illustrates, decisions of international
judges may reflect and reinforce prevailing power dynamics, thus
obviating the need for direct state control over their judicial decisions
(at least from the perspective of powerful states).
It is important to underscore the dynamic nature of the
international court-state relationship. The judicial opinions issued by
a court, particularly if they are closely reasoned, may themselves
24 1
change influential state actors' understanding of the legal rules.
Decisions by international courts can become focal points, which
states then adopt as authoritative, even if they would have preferred
an alternative rule. 242 Scholars of the European Court of Justice have
demonstrated that decisions from international courts may also be
adopted by domestic courts and incorporated into domestic legal
3
systems in a manner not subject to the executive's control.24
Although this process has not yet developed fully in international
criminal law, one can find citations to the Tribunals' cases in a variety
of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 244 other U.S. federal
courts, 245 Spain's Audiencia Nacional,246 the German Federal

239. See generally Karen Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts In Their Political
Context (TranState Working Paper, Paper No. 08, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=622222; Posner & Yoo, supra note 229; Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 224; Steinberg,
supra note 204.
240. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations,42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3, 25 (1998).
241. Alvarez, supra note 202, at 574.
242. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 212, at 1266-69.
243. Burley & Mattli, supranote 4, at 62-64.
244. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004) (Breyer, J, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
245. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949-51 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp.2d
1258, 1307-08 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp.2d 289, 322-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Constitutional Court, 247 the Canadian Supreme Court, 248 the Federal
Court of Australia, 249 and the U.K. House of Lords. 250 Once a court's
decisions become diffused into other international and domestic
courts, as a practical matter it can be quite difficult for a state to
contest the subsequent rules, even for states that are not party to the
treaty creating the court.
An international court also becomes an intellectual hub around
which NGOs, individuals, academics, and even other international
courts, can organize and disseminate the court's cases.
The
restatement on customary international law of the laws of war
released by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 2005
makes frequent reference to the Tribunals' cases. 25 1 A commissioner
on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that the
commission has profited from the Tribunals' jurisprudence and that "it
has weighed heavily in our deliberations" in cases related to armed
conflict. 252 These factors can make it difficult for a state-even a
hegemon-to control the development of a political and legal regime.
The staff of international courts may themselves act as
transnational norm entrepreneurs by directly participating in the
dissemination of the rules they generate. 253 The ICTY had an official
representative at the ICC negotiations. ICTY and ICTR judges,
prosecutors, and administrative officials have conducted training
sessions for the staff of other international and domestic courts
Prosecutors at the ICC have
adjudicating international crimes.

246. Case of Adolfo Scilingo, Audencia Nacional, Apr. 19, 2005 (Sentencia Num. 16/2005),
available at http://www.derechos.orglnizkorlespanaljuicioral/doclsentencia.html.
247. In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. AI-M., a Yemeni Citizen, and
His Motion for a Temporary Injunction, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Nov. 5, 2003, 2 BVR 1506/03 ( 150) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.
bverfg.de/entscheidungerframes/rs20031105_2bvrl5O6O3en.html.
248. Suresh v. Canada Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2002] S.C.C. 1, 2002 C.R.R.
LEXIS 4 (Can. 2002).
249. Nulyarimma v. Thompson (1999) 96 F.C.R. 153, 208 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/1999/1192.html.
250. Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, (1999) (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pald199899ldjudgmt/jd990324/pinol.htm.
251. I

INTERNATIONAL

COMMITTEE

OF THE RED

CROSS,

CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW 7-8, 10, 317, 430 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds.,
2005).
252. Robert K. Goldman, Remarks, The Contributions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1509, 1535 (1998).

253. For discussions of the roles of entrepreneurs in effecting institutional change, see JOHN
L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 186-87 (2004). For an analysis of how
supranational entrepreneurs affect the "domestic and transnational coordination of information
and ideas," see Andrew Moravcsik, A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and
InternationalCooperation, 53 INT'L ORG. 267, 283 (1999).
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provided assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was
established to try Saddam Hussein and other members of his regime.
These developments all underscore the importance of further
exploration of the functions played by international institutions and
particularly how they play out over time.
B. The Promise of Temporary Courts
What is particularly striking about the international judicial
transformation of the laws of war is that the most important courts in
The literature on
this story were temporary institutions.
international institutions has generally ignored the importance of
temporary courts, and this is an unfortunate oversight. Both the
ICTY and the ICTR were established with relatively little controversy,
which was undoubtedly due in large part to their limited temporal and
geographic jurisdiction. Yet, in many ways, they have acted as twin
petri dishes for the international criminal project writ large, helping
spawn the newer generation of special courts of various types in Sierra
Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Cambodia, and Iraq, as well as the ICC.
Legal and political scholars have increasingly explored how
states vary the design of international agreements in order to manage
uncertainty. 254 Legal agreements that are formally non-bindingoften described as "soft law"-allow governments to "introduce rules
on a tentative basis, test political reactions to them[,] and preserve
deniability if the responses are adverse." 255 Soft law also creates "a
setting for normative entrepreneurs to persuade skeptics."256 A
temporary court may provide benefits similar to soft law, particularly
in an area where the norms are relatively sparse and political
negotiation is deadlocked. A temporary court may generate a focal
point for negotiations and for the organization of supportive NGO
activity. It may allow governments to test the political feasibility of a
greater legalization of a particular area in cases where the negotiating
2 57
costs of developing a permanent court are prohibitive.

254. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to InternationalCooperation
[hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation], in THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 200, at 50, 70; Andrew T.
Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579, 611 (2005); Kal

Raustiala, Form and Substance In International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 610-13
(2005).
255. Abbott & Snidal, Pathways to InternationalCooperation,supra note 254, at 70.
256. Id.

257. For a discussion of negotiating costs and legalization, see Judith Goldstein et al.,
Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 397-98 (2000).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1:1

To some degree, temporary courts also allow states to limit the
time for which they will be exposed to the effects of a legalized regime.
Institutional solutions (although not temporary international courts)
for managing long-term uncertainty have been explored by a number
of scholars. 258 Paradoxically, the promise of temporary courts lies
precisely in leveraging their long-range consequences. Governments
that are truly reluctant about developing an area of international law
will likely be suspicious of a temporary court, as well as a permanent
one. Governments that are ambivalent, however, may be open to
persuasion.
Temporary courts are likely to be a limited solution to
international institutional design. Many international problems are
not well-suited to judicial decisionmaking, and courts-even
temporary ones-are more expensive and logistically demanding than
a simple soft law instrument. If one can extrapolate from the limited
sample provided by the ICTY and the ICTR, temporary courts are
likely to be established in the wake of dramatic or catastrophic events,
such as armed conflict or, conceivably, environmental disasters.
Activists who seek to use this solution would be well advised,
therefore, to have a template of a court ready to brandish at an
opportune moment. For the ICTY and the ICTR, Nuremberg provided
a ready-made model. The first call for the establishment of the ICTY
came in an article entitled "Nuremberg Now" that ran in a Belgrade
newspaper in 1991.259 Temporary courts may also be more likely to
occur in issue areas in which the media can demonstrate the problem
in a vivid way, which NGOs or sympathetic states can then use to
marshal public opinion.
The limited applicability of temporary courts, however, should
not undercut their potential power. There are other recent examples
of temporary dispute-settlement mechanisms, such as the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, that are widely considered successful international
institutions. 260 The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal also served as an
important model for the subsequent United Nations Compensation
Commission established after the first Gulf War. 26 1 The Holocaust
Claims Commission and a variety of older commissions have also been

258. Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 235, at 441-44; Barbara Koremenos,
Can CooperationSurvive Changes in BargainingPower?: The Case of Coffee, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
$259, $282 (2002).
259. HAZAN, supra note 67, at 16.
260. Posner & Yoo, supra note 229, at 33-34.
261. David D. Caron, The United Nations Compensation Commission for Claims Arising Out
of the 1991 Gulf War: The "ArisingPrior to" Decision, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 309, 317
(2005).
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well received. Although it is not a court, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade was also a temporary institution (albeit a long-lived
one) that paved the way for the permanent and much more
The benefits of
comprehensive World Trade Organization. 262
temporary international courts or quasi-courts clearly demand closer
scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has traced the development of the laws of war, and
its interaction with international criminal law, from the Nuremberg
Tribunals though the establishment of the International Criminal
Throughout this period, the scope and enforcement
Court.
mechanisms of the laws of war have been the subject of particular
debate. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals saw the prosecution of
individuals for war crimes committed in the European and Pacific
theatres. The trials did not, however, result in a permanent body to
enforce the laws of war. On the contrary, the diplomatic records from
the 1949 and 1974-77 conferences reveal that most states preferred to
enforce the Geneva Conventions through the mechanism of domestic
They were decidedly hostile to the idea of an
prosecutions.
international court for war crimes.
The records from the conferences on the Geneva Conventions
expose a battle between states that sought to extend the laws of war to
civil wars and those that fiercely resisted such a move. In 1949, the
opponents were colonialist powers and their newly-liberated colonies.
By 1977, the colonialists had lost their empires. The Great Powers
preferred more extensive rules on civil wars, but they did not care
enough to overcome the resistance of developing countries.
The legal regime governing civil wars remained skeletal and
largely ineffectual until the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR
by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 and 1994. Although
the Council declared that the Tribunals would not create new law, the
ICTY has substantially broadened the rules governing civil wars, and
it has lowered the thresholds for the triggering of the rules on
international conflicts. States codified these developments in the
treaty governing the International Criminal Court. As long as the
ICC is a functioning institution, it will serve as a de facto enforcement
scheme for the Geneva Conventions, parallel to the grave-breach
regime set up by the original treaties.

262. Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 235, at 436.
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The history of the Tribunals suggests that delegated
lawmaking may be an important corollary to the creation of an
international court, even if the creating states and the courts' judges
deny such a role. This Article has argued that international judicial
lawmaking is particularly appropriate when the underlying treaties
are anachronistic, and there exists little possibility for their revision
in a diplomatic setting. The history of the international criminal
regime also illustrates the powerful force of temporary international
courts. Although the Tribunals possess only a limited temporal and
geographical jurisdiction, they have constituted a critical step toward
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court not
subject to the direct control of the Security Council.
From the United States' perspective, the development of
international criminal law is a story of both success and setback. The
United States was the primary proponent and supporter of most of the
international courts in this story. The courts' design and subsequent
lawmaking substantially reflected the legal positions taken by the
United States. The recent development of the ICC, however, has been
one that the United States finds unwelcome. The defeat for the
United States in the ICC negotiations was due to the skillful
negotiations undertaken by the group of Like-Minded-States, which
included Canada and members of the European Union, and the work
of NGOs that effectively undermined the bargaining power of minority
views. The critical moment of the negotiations was Britain's defection,
when it became the first member of the P-5 to break away from the
U.S.-sponsored proposal for Security Council control over the Court's
jurisdiction. Although President Clinton appeared poised to accept
the result of the ICC treaty negotiations, President Bush has
significantly hardened the U.S. opposition to the Court.
The history told here emphasizes the importance of state and
institutional change. The changes of heart of both the United States
and Great Britain with regard to international criminal enforcement
illustrate the importance of constructing models of state behavior that
account for alterations in state preferences. The influence of the ICTY
and the ICTR on the ultimate shape of the ICC highlights the ways in
which international institutions can transform the international
environment in which states, NGOs, and other actors debate the
proper reach and content of international rules.
A. FutureAreas for Research
The history of the criminal Tribunals suggests several avenues
for future study. With regard to judicial lawmaking, the relationship
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between judicial articulation of international law and state observance
of the resulting rules bears closer scrutiny. If states routinely ignore
the norms pronounced by international courts, then their source as a
generator of international rules becomes much less promising. It
would be particularly useful to isolate factors that make states more
likely to obey decisions by international courts. Do the conditions
advocated in this Article-namely, treaty obsolescence, changed
conditions, and little likelihood for state revision-make states more
amenable to judicial norm creation? Extended across a number of
issue areas, such information would be extremely useful for
policymakers, academics, and international judges alike.
Another important question is whether international courts
systematically disadvantage developing countries.
Conventional
wisdom holds that developing countries prefer international courts
over diplomacy because courts level the playing field between the
powerful and the weak.
The limited sample provided by the
Tribunals' law-of-war jurisprudence, however, demonstrates that the
courts embraced the positions taken by powerful states at the
negotiating table and undercut the gains made by newly-independent
former colonies. Ironically, U.S. officials often exhibit a deep distrust
for the decisions of international courts. The Tribunals demonstrate
that such skepticism may well be misplaced. Better understanding
the political implications of international judicial lawmaking would
help clarify the terms-and stakes-of the debate over the function
played by international courts in power politics.
The sixty-year history of international criminal law and the
laws of war also highlight the need for a better understanding of
international institutional change and its interaction with state
preferences.
The Tribunals' history suggests that international
institutions can themselves transform, or at least alter, the political
environment.
Building a more nuanced and theoretically rich
understanding of the dynamic role played by international institutions
constitutes a fruitful area of future inquiry. A particularly interesting
question is whether international courts exhibit more autonomy or
transformative
potential than other forms of international
institutions.
Finally, the promise of temporary institutionsincluding, but not limited to, courts-is an important area of future
research.
B. The Future of InternationalCriminal Law
The ICC has become a central symbol of the trans-Atlantic
battle between Europe and the United States. The outcome of the
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conflict for international criminal law is far from assured. The United
States is currently waging a strong rear-guard action against the ICC.
It is seeking special exemptions from prosecution, known as Article 98
agreements, from countries all over the world. 263 As one U.S. official
has said, "if you find a rock with a flag on it, we'll negotiate an
agreement." 264 The United States has enacted domestic legislation
forbidding its cooperation with the Court. The legislation includes
military authorization to rescue U.S. nationals detained by the
Court-leading critics of the measure to dub it the "Hague Invasion
Act." 265 In lieu of the ICC, the United States endorses alternative
models for addressing international crimes, such as the temporary
266
courts that have been established in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
Until recently, the United States successfully used the Security
Council's authority under the Rome Statute to defer investigations to
ensure that its peacekeepers would not be subject to the Court's
jurisdiction. 267 In the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal,
however, the United States was unable to secure a renewal of the
relevant resolution. 268 On March 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council
formally referred the Darfur situation in Sudan to the ICC. The
Council's European members were strong proponents of the
resolution, and the United States did not veto it. The Sudan referral
is the most visible symbol that the United States is either unable or
unwilling to control the course of international criminal law. Whether
the Europeans and other states can sustain the ICC without U.S.
support is an open question. It is certainly unprecedented.
Since the establishment of the ICC, another war-the War on
Terrorism-has begun. Interpreting the laws of war has also been
central to this conflict. Whether this war will result in a further
modification of the rules is, as yet, unknown. The Tribunals' cases
263. Judith Kelley, Do States Care About Normative Consistency?: The ICC and Bilateral
Non-Surrender Agreements as a Quasi-Experiment 6-8 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
264. Betsy Pisik, Amnesty for U.S. Citizens Boosted, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at Al
(quoting anonymous U.S. official).
265. Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, U.N. Funds in Crossfire Over Court: Exemption Sought
for U.S. Troops, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2001, at Al.
266. See Pierre Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, State
Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, in FED. NEWS SERVICE (May 6, 2002). These courts
are described in Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003).
267. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July
12, 2002) (requesting that the ICC not investigate or prosecute any officials or personnel from a
"contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United
Nations established or authorized operation").
268. Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt G.1's from U.N. Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2004, at Al.
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have thus far had little to say that is directly relevant to the War on
Terrorism, although the ICTR Appeals Chamber has recently issued a
decision condemning pretrial detention without charge. This decision
may have implications for the United States' prisoners at
Guantinamo Bay. 269 Furthermore, the conflict in Iraq is largely270 not
subject to the ICC's jurisdiction, because neither the United States nor
Iraq has ratified the Statute.
Whatever the impact of the War on Terrorism on the laws of
war, in the International Criminal Court the twin stories of the laws
of war and international criminal law have once again joined.
Whether their union will produce a legal regime that is better capable
of deterring large-scale war crimes than prior efforts represents the
triumph of hope over experience. While this second marriage may
well prove more enduring, it is likely to continue to evolve in ways
both predictable and unexpected.

269. Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Judgement,
224 (May 23, 2005),
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by British officials. Richard Norton-Taylor, InternationalCourt Hears Anti-war Claims: Lawyers
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